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1. Executive Summary
Particular features of Canada’s capital market inform our consideration of moving towards
a more proportionate regulatory system, specifically, Canada has a large number of small
public companies; its market cap is concentrated largely in four provinces; it has a
particular focus on mining, resources and technology; and a significant number of issuers
are cross-listed on US exchanges. Canadian securities regulators have already recognized
some measure of proportionate regulation in their national instruments, based on the type
of listing.
The paper suggests that a number of overriding principles or considerations should be taken
into account in respect of a further move towards proportionate regulation. They include:
•

Proportionate regulation must balance access to capital and the long term sustainability
of the market; a key objective is maintaining the integrity of Canadian capital markets.

•

The benchmark of the regulatory system continues to be materiality, in that while
periodic disclosure or other compliance requirements may be proportionate, all issuers
must continue to ensure that material change is disclosed to the market in a timely,
accurate and comprehensible manner, a requirement that should not be scaled.

•

Decision making in respect of adopting further proportionate regulation should be
timely, transparent and relevant for market participants and should be implemented
only after broad consultation. A possible methodology is to identify a problem or
difficulty that may justify a proportionate response and then work with market
participants to scale the requirement appropriately, using one or more of the tools cited
above or other problem solving strategies.

•

There is a need for transparency and bright line delineation in respect of which issuers
fall in which category of proportionate regulatory requirements.

•

Investors must have a clear understanding of the risk associated with issuers that
comply with modified disclosure and governance requirements, including explanatory
notes on periodic reporting documents and prospectuses, public education and plain
language disclosure.

•

If the delineation is venture/non-venture, smaller issuers on the TSX and comparable
exchanges must be given guidance regarding compliance with the more extensive
requirements.

•

If the delineation is market capitalization, at either end of the market size, there is a
need for well-founded and transparent criteria on which to make a determination of
which category issuers are located.

•

Disclosed risk factors should be focused for all issuers, not overly generalized.
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•

Any proportionate regulation must be accompanied by consistent and rigorous
compliance and enforcement, to ensure integrity of the market.

•

Proportionate regulation can be used to reduce disproportionate compliance costs by
eliminating regulatory compliance requirements where they do not add value to the
integrity of the market.

•

Any proportionate regulation should recognize the extensive oversight of junior issuers
by the TSXV.

•

Any proportionate regulation must ensure that the costs of compliance associated with
any new requirements do not outweigh the benefits to market participants.

•

Under a shift to a principles/standards/outcomes-based system, all market participants
must have a shared understanding of regulatory expectations, specifically, what broad
high level principles mean in practice.
o Develop high level principles that are universal and allow junior issuers to
develop best practices sensitive to their structure and needs.
o The flexibility of principles/standards/outcomes regulation should be used to
focus requirements on junior issuers, rather than create opaque expectations.
o There should be recognition that there is a continuum of principles/standards
and outcomes-based regulation, and that any further shifts should occur after
measured consideration of benefits to the market, involving broad based and
meaningful consultation.
o Any evolution from existing standards should be measured, in terms of
assessing what outcomes a shift from current rules to principles or outcomes is
aimed at achieving and measuring the effectiveness of any shifts.
o Regulators assessing good governance practice should share that experience
with other market participants, increasing the overall knowledge base of good
practice.
o Resources need to be directed towards junior issuers in terms of supporting any
shift to principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation and transparent and
accessible guidance on best practice, so that junior issuers can develop the
capacity to meet practice compliance under any adopted principles.
o Resources are needed to allow junior issuers to participate in a meaningful way
with regulators in developing future policy or practice.
o Set appropriate strategic milestones for junior or small issuers.

•

Consultation regarding any shift to proportionate regulation and
principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation should be broad, including all market
participants, advocacy organizations and exchanges.

•

Any further move towards proportionate regulation should engage market participants
in consideration of regulatory standards and how they differentially impact market
participants.
5

•

There should be wide-spread public education regarding the different risks associated
with issuers that are proportionately regulated.

•

Evaluation of proportionate regulation, under whatever type of system is adopted,
should measure outcomes against clearly articulated goals, including assessing clear
milestones, measure the culture of compliance, cost effectiveness, ease of
implementation, reduction of investor and market risk, and benefits to market
participants.
o Regulators need to develop tools for assessing compliance if a
principles/standards and outcomes based approach is adopted.
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2. Introduction
The Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in Canada is to examine the best way to improve
securities regulation in Canada.1 Part of that mandate is to consider adoption of a
proportionate regulation regime. This paper explores the potential for proportionate
regulation of reporting issuers, including defining options for what such a system may
entail, and the underlying policy rationale.2 While previous studies have made reference to
the need to consider proportionate regulation, the contours and limits of adoption of such a
strategy have not been articulated in the public policy debate.
There are two basic questions to such an inquiry. First, what objectives of Canadian
securities law would proportionate regulation meet, both in terms of the substantive law
and the regulatory framework? Second, how can one delineate issuers by size or type, in
terms of the criteria to be applied? This paper commences with a discussion of the context
for the proportionate regulation debate; then considers these two questions, including a
discussion of how proportionate regulation has already been adopted, to a limited extent, in
Canada. It considers principles that might be applied in considering future proportionate
regulation.
Part 3 examines the context for the paper. Part 4 examines the objectives of Canadian
securities law that proportionate regulation may be responsive to, including efficient capital
markets and investor protection. It examines the challenges for introducing proportionate
regulation under various regulatory models, including the passport and common securities
regulator models, principles or outcomes based regulation, and cross-border harmonization
considerations. Part 5 explores how one can delineate issuers for regulatory purposes,
including type of listing, market capitalization and revenue based approaches, using
examples in Canada, the UK and the US. While the focus of the paper is on small or junior
issuers, Part 6 briefly discusses implications of a proportionate regulation system for
seasoned or larger issuers. Part 7 sets out broad principles and basic tools to move towards
proportionate regulation. Part 8 concludes.

1

The Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in Canada is to provide advice and recommendations to the
Minister of Finance and the provincial and territorial ministers responsible for securities regulation.
Information in this paper is current to July 31, 2008. The author deeply appreciates the cooperation of
regulators from across Canada, and, in particular, appreciates the assistance of Douglas Hyndman and Sandy
Jakab of the British Columbia Securities Commission, William Rice of the Alberta Securities Commission,
and Kevan Cowan and John McCoach of TMX Group. Thanks also to Bernard Lau, UBC Law II for research
assistance.
2
The mandate of this paper was confined to reporting issuers only, and there are different considerations for
small registrants and other market participants.
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3. The Context
The issue of proportionate regulation arises because of the unique structure of the Canadian
capital market, which is primarily national, with distinct regional features. Canadian based
issuers represent approximately 96 per cent of the companies listed on the Toronto Stock
Exchange (TSX) and TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV) and 92 per cent of the aggregate
market capital of public companies, while foreign issuers represent a relatively small, but
increasing, number of total TSX and TSXV listings.3 There are over 4,000 issuers on the
TSX and TSXV, with an average size of $1.3 billion on the senior market and $22.6
million on the junior market.4 The TSX is the largest small-to-medium enterprise (SME)
exchange in North America, and second in the world based on the number of issuers listed.5
Canada’s public equities market is a tiered market with 59 per cent of companies listed on
the TSXV.6 More than a third of TSX listed issuers, 1,373, are mining companies.7 Based
on aggregate market capital, the oil & gas industry is the most significant industry in
Canada, at 25 per cent, followed by financial services at 24.8 per cent and mining at 17 per
cent.8 Many issuers on the TSXV are at the development or exploration stage.
Based on aggregate market capital of companies with head offices in the respective
provinces, the largest provincial markets are Ontario at 40 per cent, Alberta at 26 per cent,
Québec at 11 per cent, and British Columbia at 8 per cent.9 These provinces represent
92 per cent of all public companies listed on the TSX and TSXV.10 In terms of average
market capital, Alberta is highest at $785 million; Ontario is at $700 million, Québec at
$653 million and British Columbia at $133 million.11 Much of the Canadian capital market
is made up of SME issuers in the public equities market.12
3

Rik Parkhill, Interim Co-CEO, TSX Group Inc., Speech to 8th Annual Metals and Mining Conference of
The New York Society of Security Analysts, June 4, 2008,
http://www.tsx.com/en/news_events/speeches/#Jun04-08, at 4. He observed that the TSX added 49 new
international listings in 2007. There are 30 Australian mining companies and 12 South African mining
companies on the TSX or TSXV, at 6. In 2007 alone, 219 new resource companies listed on TSX Group
exchanges, including 13 from the U.S., 9 from Australia, 2 from each of South America, China and the U.K.
At the end of last year, TSX had 58 Chinese and Chinese related companies, and to June 2008, three Chinese
issuers have joined the TSX, to total 60 Chinese issuers, making the TSX one of the top three exchanges for
the number of Chinese listings. The aggregate market capital of companies listed on the TSX and TSXV is
$2.15 trillion, up from $1.17 trillion five years.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid. at 6. TSX Group is second in the world based on the number of issuers listed on our exchanges. The
exchange with the largest number of issuers is the Bombay Stock Exchange, the small company exchange in
Mumbai, India.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid. at 7.
8
Based on TSX and TSXV data as at December 31, 2007; Alberta Securities Commission (ASC). The
Alberta Capital Market: A Comparative Overview, 2008, Report, May, 2008:
http://www.albertasecurities.com/news/ASC%20Publications/6116/The%20Alberta%20Capital%20Market.p
df, last accessed August 3, 2008 at 4.
9
Ibid. at 3.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid. at 5.
12
Income trusts represent almost 9 per cent of the aggregate market capital in Canada and 6 per cent of the
listings on the TSX and TSXV. The aggregate market capital associated with income trusts has decreased
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Each regional market has some unique characteristics. Ontario has the greatest number
listed on the TSX, followed by Alberta, and both have more issuers with over $1 billion in
market capital than other jurisdictions. British Columbia has the largest number listed on
the TSXV, followed by Ontario and then Alberta.13 628 of British Columbia’s TSXV
listed issuers have market capital of less than $10 million, whereas the province has fewer
companies than Alberta or Ontario listed on the TSX with market capital of over $250
million.14 Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia all have strong junior markets, although
the concentration differs, with mining significant in British Columbia, oil & gas in Alberta
and technology and mining in Ontario.15 84 per cent of British Columbia based companies
have a market capital of under $100 million, whereas this figure is 69 per cent for Alberta.
Alberta’s public equities market is a tiered market with a relatively even distribution of
small, medium and large companies.16 Companies with market capital of less than $25
million represent 49 per cent of Alberta’s capital market, 40 per cent of Ontario’s capital
market, 56 per cent of Québec’s capital market and 67 per cent of British Columbia’s
capital market.
Canada has the largest number of mining companies listed on its stock exchanges in the
world. More than one third of TSX listed issuers, 1,373, are mining companies, twice as
many as the next strongest mining exchange, which is Australia’s ASX, and six times as
many as the London Stock Exchange and AIM.17 Hence, Canada has a large number of
small public companies; its market cap is concentrated largely in four provinces; it has a
particular focus on mining, resources and technology; and a significant number of issuers
are cross-listed on US exchanges. These particular features drive any consideration of
moving towards a more proportionate regulatory system.
The structure of the Canadian capital market suggests that there may be different capacities
to engage in regulatory compliance with respect to the proliferation of regulatory change
implemented or being considered in the post-Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley Act era. A
principal mechanism by which regulators exercise oversight is through disclosure
requirements for entry and participation in the market, from the offering stage through to
the periodic disclosure of financial statements and the timely and accurate disclosure of
material changes. More recently, there have been requirements to disclose corporate
governance practice and internal financial controls, measuring such practices against
suggested norms, creating another set of compliance requirements. These requirements are
part of participation in modern capital markets, whether an issuer is listed only in Canada
or seeks capital in the US and other markets. Issuers necessarily consider the
administrative and resource costs of disclosure compliance in their choice of market. Yet
the question is whether existing or proposed regulatory requirements ought to be applied in
almost 4 per cent and the number of income trusts has decreased by almost 16 per cent in the past year,
largely due to changes in federal tax law, ibid. at 6.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid. at 11.
15
Ibid. at 5.
16
Ibid. at 4.
17
Parkhill, supra, note 3 at 7.
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the same manner or to the same extent for all issuers, given the different structure of the
Canadian market and the large number of small and junior issuers.
A number of studies have observed that securities regulation can be an obstacle to small
business finance and continued participation in the market.18 Due to fixed compliance
costs, small firms are disproportionately affected because larger public issuers have more
resources at their disposal than junior issuers, and the costs of compliance per dollar of
revenue generated may be lower than for junior issuers. Larger issuers can often rely on
their own personnel to comply with securities regulations rather than having to outsource
internal auditing, legal work, and compliance. Junior issuers frequently incur the costs of
such external assistance.
Often the internal expertise of a junior issuer includes geologists, engineers and other
professionals in the sector that the junior issuer is engaged in research and development or
exploration, and they have not yet hired much financial expertise, relying on underwriters,
auditors and legal advisors for that assistance. They often have relatively fewer managerial
resources; and the time required to qualify securities under a prospectus is frequently
longer. Managers of junior issuers are usually aware of regulatory requirements, but often
daunted by the complexity of disclosure and other rules.
The cost of compliance with new internal control requirements can frequently be
disproportionate to the need for such controls given the size of the issuer; and such costs
may outweigh any benefit of protection for investors. Junior issuers may have limited
access to audit assistance from big accounting firms that direct their energy first towards
their larger clients, creating issues in respect of compliance deadlines. Corporate
governance and accountability structures designed for large and complex organizations are
frequently too onerous for junior issuers, who may have only limited personnel and a
governance structure that is essentially just direct accountability to senior officers.
Junior issuers may have difficulty meeting independent director best practice requirements,
given increased compensation and insurance costs for such directors.19 Given that junior
issuers are frequently not yet generating revenue, they have not invested in governance
structures and controls, and such controls may be unhelpful given their stage of
development and may direct valuable resources away from developing the business. In
turn, excessive or inappropriately directed regulation may create a serious market
disadvantage for junior issuers.

18

H. Y. Chiu, “Can UK Small Businesses Obtain Growth Capital in Public Equity Markets? An Overview of
Shortcomings in UK and European Securities Regulation” (2003) 3 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 933977; Ontario Securities Commission, Task Force on Small Business Financing, Final report (1996),
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/Publications/op_small_business.pdf ; J.L. Huffman, “The Impact of
Regulation on Small and Emerging Business” (2000) 4 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 307317; Ginger Carroll, “Thinking Small: Adjusting Regulatory Burdens Incurred by Small Public Companies
Seeking to Comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, (2006) 58 Ala. L. Rev. 443; Interim Report of the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 30 November, 2006, online: http://www.capmktsreg.org.
19
Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance”, (2005) 114
YALE L.J. 1521, 1588.
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(a) Lack of Empirical Data
The precise scope of barriers that small or junior issuers face in Canada has not, however,
been well documented empirically, in terms of study on the true impact of proportionate
regulation or its absence. One recent empirical study on the effects of the 2001 changes to
Canadian private placement regulations to facilitate access to equity financing by SMEs
observed a statistically significant effect only on the number of issues by closed
corporations; and the authors concluded that the study results did not confirm the policy
argument that securities regulation was a major constraint to small business capital raising,
although they acknowledged that the results did not rule out that the reforms eased some
financing.20 US scholars examining a number of empirical studies relating to SarbanesOxley Act (S-Ox) regulatory requirements concluded that there was evidence that S-Ox had
a disproportionately negative impact on smaller firms, at least at its initial implementation,
but the evidence was not conclusive in respect of long-term effects.21 Hence, while
uniform regulation is likely in some instances to be onerous to smaller issuers, there needs
to be further empirical study of precisely the extent to which the problem exists, how it
affects capital raising processes, and how any changes could respond to such problems.
Similarly, there is little empirical data on the extent to which junior or smaller issuers do or
do not pose higher risks to the marketplace from governance, financial or regulatory
compliance deficiencies. Where such issuers are seeking capital, there is a considerable
amount of information in the market because of the need for the issuer to attract
underwriter support and meet prospectus and other regulatory requirements. However, in
the periods between offerings, there may be less market and regulatory scrutiny, posing
some risk to secondary market investors. While the quantum of potential harm to investors
could be lower than from larger issuers, given the size of market capitalization, the risk of
non-compliant behaviour could be higher for some firms that lack the resources, skill or
information to ensure best practices and regulatory compliance. Junior issuers are often
relationship based, and the degree of best practices may depend largely on the senior
officers and the culture of compliance and best practice encouraged. There appears to be
little data to support or negate the extent of risks unique to junior issuers. Regulatory
compliance and governance risks need to be distinguished from the higher risks associated
with the inherent nature of a junior issuer in its exploratory or research and development
stage.
With that important caveat about the availability of Canadian data, this paper considers
proportionate regulation as a policy choice. The degree of regulation on the activities of
market participants must be proportionate to the regulatory objectives.
20

Cecile Carpentier, Jean-Francois L’Her and Jean-Marc Suret, “Does Securities Regulation Constrain Small
Business Finance? An Empirical Analysis”, forthcoming in (2008) Small Business Economics,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1131792, last accessed July 25, 2008. The changes came about as a result of an OSC
Task Force, which found that in respect of public financings, the costs of preparing and filing a prospectus
and related costs are borne disproportionately by SMEs because the direct costs are relatively higher for
smaller offerings, at 7.
21
Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic, and Eric Talley, “Sarbanes-Oxley’s Effects on Small Firms: What is the
Evidence?” (June 2007), USC CLEO Research Paper No. C07-9, http://ssrn.com/abstract=993198; but see the
study by Wu et al, discussed below under the Part on public float.
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The financing needs of junior issuers vary significantly depending on the type of business
and stage of development, as financing is usually a multi-stage process. There is no
common standard for defining small issuers or junior issuers. They are variously defined
by reference to their market capitalization, type of listing, revenues, assets, debt facilities,
length of operating history and ownership structure.
4. What Objectives of Canadian Securities Law Would Proportionate Regulation
Meet?
“Proportionate”, “scaled” or “measured” regulation is the notion that securities regulation
should recognize the different risks and benefits of issuers by their size, experience in the
market, resources or capacity to act. Its underlying premise is that junior issuers often do
not have the resources or personnel to comply with the full range of disclosure and other
regulatory requirements. Given the size and nature of their capital needs, regulators in some
jurisdictions have concluded that small or junior issuers pose lower risk to the market, and
should be subject to different or less onerous requirements.22 Other regulators, such as in
the US, have concluded that larger seasoned issuers should also receive scaled treatment
because of their record in the market and the availability of more information over a
sustained period.23
Proportionate regulation can mean a range of options, from exemption from particular
regulatory compliance to a range of measured or scaled adjustment of specific requirements
for particular size or type of issuer.
(a) Efficient Capital Markets and Investor Protection
In Canada, securities laws articulate two concurrent goals: to foster fair and efficient capital
markets; and to provide protection to investors from unfair, improper or fraudulent
practices. British Columbia describes these goals as fostering a securities market that is
fair and warrants public confidence, with a dynamic and competitive securities industry
that provides investment opportunities and access to capital.24 While sometimes
juxtaposed as competing objectives, these concurrent goals are really aspects of the same
challenge, as investor protection is a necessary element of fostering confidence in the
market such that capital can be raised in a timely and efficient manner. Proportionate
regulation can advance these concurrent goals.
Regulatory requirements should advance the public’s understanding of the risks inherent in
the issuer’s activities. Where disclosure and other regulatory requirements do not advance
public policy goals, they should not be required. Scaled requirements that allow the market
access to the information required to make effective investment choices can assist with
22

See the discussion below in respect of the FSA in the UK and the SEC in the US. Some may contest that
they impose lower risk to the market.
23
See the discussion in Part 5 below.
24
British Columbia Securities Commission Service Plan 2008-2011,
http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/ServicePlan_2008-2011.pdf. See also British Columbia Securities
Commission (BCSC), submission to Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, June, 2008, www.bcsc.ca.
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raising capital on a less costly basis. Investors are protected through continued, but more
focused requirements, but they must be able to fully appreciate any demarcation in terms of
different standards being applied. A critical aspect of any proportionate regulation is to
ensure that the integrity of regulatory requirements and the rigour of enforcement are
maintained.
The objectives of securities regulation and the principles of transparency, fairness and
certainty underlay any policy choices. The categorization of issuers that will have different
regulatory requirements must be transparent for capital market participants. Transparency
for issuers is necessary in terms of understanding qualifying criteria and regulatory
obligations; for understanding when they would transition from one set of regulatory
requirements to another, either upward or downward, based on issuer definitions.
Transparency is also essential for investors, their advisors, and other consumers of
securities in terms of their understanding the different reporting and oversight protections,
so that they can make appropriate assessments of risk and return. Regulators must also
have clear expectations of issuers in continuing disclosure and other aspects of securities
law, in order to appropriately assess compliance; facilitate options for joint problem
solving; allow for effective risk-based enforcement; and in order to understand the legal
standard of proof to be met in any enforcement activities.
The objective of protection of investors from particular kinds of market conduct also
engages notions of fairness in considering proportionate regulation. For issuers, this
concern is fairness in terms of what side of a demarcation line the issuer falls on and the
consequent regulatory requirements. If the measure for the smaller issuer is market
capitalization, for example, the issue is what are the appropriate cutoff points
distinguishing the size of issuer. With respect to investors and other consumers, fairness is
engaged in terms of their reasonable expectations of the role of regulators in their oversight
of market participants. The delineation of what companies may be subject to different time
requirements or differently focused disclosure requirements may not create unfairness if
there is transparent notice to consumers that different standards apply and clear policy
reasons for different standards. Examples are the oil & gas and mining sectors, where there
are specialized requirements for disclosure, aimed at allowing potential investors and
others to have particular technical data in order to make informed choices regarding
potential risk and return in their capital investment.25
Another consideration for investor protection is the role of market participants other than
regulators, as sources of information in the market about both junior and senior issuers.
Analyst following and underwriter involvement provide external information to the market;
and one issue is the extent to which this scrutiny or analysis serves an investor protection
function. For example, in a study of 100 Canadian issuers with 10 firms in each of ten
market ranges of capitalization, Pritchard and Choi found that analyst coverage increases
with issuer size, although they also found that small issuers making an offering were also

25

See for example, NI 51-101 Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities, 2002, as amended effective
December 28, 2007 and NI 43-101 Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects, 2001, as amended effective
December 30, 2005.
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likely to have analyst coverage.26 Out of the firms making offerings in their study, only
two issuers under a market cap of $345 million had no analyst coverage. Based on that
analysis, Pritchard subsequently suggested that issuers with a market cap of greater than
$345 million had better analyst coverage such that they should qualify for well-known
seasoned issuer (WKSI) type treatment in Canada.27 In developing the category of issuers
for WKSI treatment in the US, the SEC relied on analyst coverage as one of the factors.28
Thus, proportionate regulation may have to take account of the fact that there is lower
analyst coverage for junior or small issuers. Analyst coverage of junior issuers is likely to
be less, although where they are seeking capital through an offering, the amount of
coverage increases.29
This lower coverage may be offset in part by information to the market from underwriting
offerings. Junior issuers seek underwriting as a means to attract market confidence in their
offering. Underwriters provide considerable information to the market about the issuer for
both reputational and regulatory certification reasons, whether under “best efforts” or “firm
commitment” underwriting arrangements.30 The role of external market information must
be assessed in conjunction with regulatory oversight in considering investor protection in
any proportionate system.
Proportionate disclosure should be based on what is relevant to investors. For example,
investors in start up and junior companies may attach considerable importance to the record
of management, the track record of finding the resource or mineral sought, in building
equity, in securing mineral rights or licences, probable reserves, or intellectual property
rights in the case of some sectors such as biotechnology. These indicia of potential return
may be more important to investors than extensive disclosures on governance controls.
While financial statements are critically important aspects of continuous disclosure, they
could be more targeted for junior issuers, in terms of what needs to be assessed by market
participants, fostering greater confidence in the market.
The issue of proportionate regulation also engages the question of market competitiveness.
As the discussion of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in the United Kingdom
(UK) below indicates, issuers will be drawn to regulatory systems that are more responsive
to their needs and which do not impose regulatory requirements that do not advance goals
of investor protection or efficient markets. There is a balance that needs to be achieved
between the cost of regulation and its benefits to all market participants.

26

Study cited in Adam Pritchard, “Well-Know Seasoned Issuers in Canada”, Research Study for the Task
Force to Modernize Securities Legislation, May, 2006 at 17.
27
Firms with $345 to $800 million market cap had an average of 3.5 analysts per issuer. Adam Pritchard,
“Well-Know Seasoned Issuers in Canada”, ibid. at 7.
28
Along with two other factors, trading volume and institutional ownership, Securities Offering Reform,
Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, July 19, 2005, at 35.
29
Pritchard observes that the higher level of analyst coverage for firms making offerings should be
interpreted with caution as firms may provide such coverage in an effort to attract underwriting business,
supra, note 26 at 19.
30
M. Condon, A. Anand and J. Sarra, Securities Regulation in Canada, (Toronto: Emond Montgomery,
2005).
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(b) Regulatory Oversight and Proportionate Regulation
The options for the oversight of a proportionate regulation system offer different
advantages and disadvantages, although design and implementation of proportionate
regulation is equally feasible for a passport securities regime, a passport system with a
common adjudicative scheme, or a common securities regulator. Proportionate regulation
requires national cooperation if it is to be uniformly applied. Otherwise standards would be
too fragmented and create prohibitive cost barriers to raising capital in more than one
jurisdiction. It would also lack the requisite transparency and certainty for investors and
other market participants, in that different regional standards would mask the contours of
risk and protection to investors.
Without analyzing the merits of any of the regulatory oversight options, as that complex
and important issue is well beyond the scope of this paper, there are some considerations
that can briefly be set out in terms of thinking about issues that may arise with the different
proposed models.
Passport System
Under the passport system, all Canadian regulators, except Ontario, have agreed that one
securities regulatory authority acts as the principal regulator for all materials relating to a
filer.31 All jurisdictions have agreed to cooperate under National Policy 11-202, Process
for Prospectus Reviews in Multiple Jurisdictions, effective March 2008, which sets out the
means by which an issuer can enjoy the benefits of co-ordinated review by the principal
regulator and Ontario regulator in filing and receipting of prospectuses.32 The system
marks a new level of coordination among securities regulators and offers the potential for
further negotiation of national instruments and policies that would consider proportionate
regulation.33 The advantage of the passport system for proportionate regulation is that any
further recognition of scaled requirements through this system would be highly sensitive to
differences in regional capital markets. The process of negotiation among different
regulators has to date allowed for considerable public policy debate on the impact of
proposed standards on particular types of issuers, investors and the market more generally.
Any further development towards proportionate regulation would benefit from this broad
based consultative input.
The disadvantage of the passport system in terms of moving toward greater proportionate
regulation is the time and cost of building consensus on regulatory changes that may be
required. The question is whether that time and cost is merited because the outcome in
respect of how proportionate regulation is implemented is more sensitive to regional
market differences. There is also the challenge of different regulators interpreting and
31

NI 41-101 expressly recognizes the passport system, creating a “passport prospectus” and a “dual
prospectus”, where issuers are seeking to distribute in more than one Canadian jurisdiction. National Policy
11-202 Process for Prospectus Reviews in Multiple Jurisdictions, effective March 17, 2008, describes the
process for filing and review of prospectuses, including investment fund and shelf prospectuses, amendments
to prospectuses and related materials in multiple jurisdictions.
32
NI 11-202 Process for Prospectus Reviews in Multiple Jurisdictions.
33
Some examples of proportionate regulation in Canada are discussed in the next part of this paper.
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enforcing nationally negotiated proportionate standards differently, although regulators in
recent years have cooperated to a greater degree in their compliance and enforcement
initiatives.
Passport System with National Adjudication Structure
A passport system with a national adjudication structure poses some of the same benefits
and challenges in terms of negotiating principles or standards for proportionate regulation,
although once a principle or standard is established and affirmed by a national adjudicative
tribunal, it would be uniformly applied by the regulators across Canada. The principal
advantage is in having the benefit of carefully negotiated regulation, as discussed for the
passport system, and then having one interpretation of national instruments, legislation and
other rules that create special requirements for junior issuers. Such an option could increase
fairness and lower transaction costs for small or junior issuers because there would likely
be clear and consistent adjudicative guidance on what standards mean in practice, which
does not necessarily occur under the passport system.
The negative feature of proportionate regulation under this second model may be the
adjustment costs as regulators amend or shift their local policy and compliance structures
and norms to meet with any national adjudicative body’s substantive ruling in respect of a
small or junior issuer requirement, a challenge not only confined to the issue of
proportionate regulation.
Common Securities Regulator
A common securities regulator would possibly allow for greater ease of policy change,
allowing for more timely decision making in respect of regulatory change more generally
and proportionate regulation more specifically, a significant advantage, assuming that there
are processes in place for meaningful participation based on region and type of market
participant. Smaller issuers and other market participants could potentially have more
timely and cost effective interactions with regulators, as they would deal with only one
jurisdiction and pay one set of regulatory fees, although considerably more resources would
be needed to effectively serve smaller market participants on a national basis.34 As with the
common adjudicative option, the interpretation of proportionate regulation could be more
consistent and fair across the country, advancing the goals of investor protection and
market efficiency.
However, a common securities regulatory system may be less sensitive to regional
difference, and in particular, the regulatory compliance needs of junior issuers that are not
located in Ontario, where many national regulatory bodies tend to be located. Under such a
system, regional enforcement centres would not necessarily be the solution if there was not
meaningful regional input by the public and regulatory authorities into policy choices
regarding compliance.

34

The issue of the amount of fees that would be required to sustain a national system sensitive to regional
needs is beyond the scope of this paper, but is an important question.
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Key considerations for proportionate regulation in a common regulator system would be
that there is a decision making mechanism that assesses the need for, and possible options
for, modified regulation that is sensitive to differences in regional markets by size and
sector; that the system create the resources and structure to allow small or junior issuers to
be involved in a meaningful way in such policy and regulatory development; that the
common adjudicative function be designed to ensure sensitivity to type and sector of junior
and small issuers; and that any new proportionate regulation be monitored for its
effectiveness or outcomes as measured against the rationale for the differentiated standard.
Market Competition/Hybrid Model
A hybrid of a passport system and common securities regulator is another possibility,
similar to corporate law, where companies have the option of incorporating under the
Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) or any provincial or territorial corporate law.
Provinces design their corporate law to attract companies, such as unlimited liability
companies in Nova Scotia or companies with par value shares in British Columbia. While
provincial corporate law has extraterritorial provisions to facilitate companies moving or
undertaking arrangements or other capital structure changes that engage more than one
province or territory, companies can opt to register under the CBCA for federal coverage
and one set of rules, wherever they operate. This dual structure has arguably created a
market for incorporation in Canada.
Considering only the issue of proportionate regulation under a dual securities law structure,
a common regulator could continue to develop proportionate regulation on a national basis,
in a timely fashion, having regard for regional needs and input as discussed above.35 While
national buy-in of all jurisdictions would be the goal of any new regulatory principles or
standards for junior issuers, all issuers would have the potential to immediately opt into a
proportionate regulation system by registering with the common regulator. In essence,
there would be a market for registration, as issuers could list with the common regulator or
with a passport provincial jurisdiction.
While the contours of such a hybrid approach are beyond the scope of this discussion, the
common regulator with a clearly proportionate regulatory regime could provide a market
alternative for issuers and their advisors. The issuer would not face fragmentation in
requirements; and there would be a high degree of transparency in a single set of scaled
requirements. The same considerations in respect of access to regulatory decision making,
sensitivity to regional diversity, and monitoring for effectiveness would apply to this
approach, as noted above.36

35

Under such a system, provincial or territorial regulators could opt to authorize the common regulator to
undertake all regulation and oversight in their jurisdiction, thus becoming part of a national regulatory
system, or could opt to carry on as a regulator under the passport system.
36
If the common regulator were to adopt a principles or outcomes based approach, there would be a further
aspect of a market for securities regulation created and different considerations would apply, as discussed
below.
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National Enforcement Approach
A fourth option being considered is a national enforcement agency. This option is harder
to speculate on with respect to considerations for proportionate regulation as the idea
appears to separate the policy and oversight function of securities regulators from the
enforcement and adjudicative function, which seems counter intuitive from both a need to
ensure that the range of regulatory tools – communication of principles and policies, setting
of standards, guidance, problem solving, and compliance warnings - are compatible with
enforcement, the latter of which really only becomes important when earlier parts of the
system do not work. In terms of junior issuers, who may be more in need of those earlier
tools, any disconnect between regulatory oversight and enforcement could be extremely
costly and, in some cases, could affect the financial viability of the junior issuer. Regulators
in Canada currently tend to focus on different aspects of regulatory requirements in their
enforcement activities,37 and it is not clear as to whether these regional differences are a
function of particular regional conduct or enforcement preferences of particular regulators.
Absent a clearer understanding of these dynamics and the pattern along the continuum of
information, guidance, compliance and enforcement, it is difficult to assess the potential
issues associated with proportionate regulation and this model.
In summary, the passport system, the national adjudicative model, the common regulator
model and the hybrid approach all offer some positive potential for proportionate
regulation, but each also pose challenges in considering how policy choices would be made
and implemented. If layered with principles-based regulation, the challenges could be
more complex if practice develops regionally in terms of meeting broad principles and
standards and is adjudicated nationally.
(c) Principles/Standards/Outcomes Based Approaches and Proportionate Regulation
Proportionate regulation as a policy option requires consideration of the interplay between
a rules-based and a principles-based regulatory regime. In reality, Canada, as many
jurisdictions, is moving to an amalgam of these concepts, redefining rules as “standards” or
“outcomes-based regulation” and informing them through articulated principles.38 This
debate is the subject of another paper for the Expert Panel, and beyond the scope of this
paper.
However, it merits note that if Canada is to shift further towards a principles/
standards/outcomes-based system, then it is necessary to examine the implications for
37

Mary Condon, The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Orders by Securities Regulators in Canada,
research paper for the Wise Persons Committee, 2003.
38
See for example, Ontario Securities Commission, Annual Report 2007,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/AnnualRpt/2008/goal1.html; CSA, Principles and Practices for the Sale of
Products and Services in the Financial Sector;
http://search.osc.gov.on.ca/en/query.html?col=osc&qt=+principles&charset=iso-88591&ql=&rf=1&Search.x=5&Search.y=3; IDA, Establishment and Amendment of IDA Rules to Implement the
Core Principles of the Client Relationship Model,
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/MarketRegulation/SRO/ida/rr/srr-ida_20080229_amd-client-relation.pdf . See also,
as an example, the discussion of proposed NI 31-103, below in this part.
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proportionate regulation. The premise of such a system is that regulators should intervene
in the market only where necessary and only to the extent to remedy a market problem in a
fair and cost efficient way that reduces risk to the integrity of the market.39 Such a system
could recognize the barriers faced by junior issuers and the need to appropriately scale
compliance requirements to reflect both their resources and the assurances sought by their
investors.
The UK sets broad principles with guidance on compliance and standards where necessary,
measuring the value of regulatory intervention by assessing outcomes and milestones, the
cost effectiveness of regulation, and the effectiveness of enforcement.40 The FSA’s high
level principles of business conduct focus on skill, care, diligence, risk management,
financial resources, fair treatment of investors and market conduct.41 The FSA’s approach
is that a regulator should only intervene in markets where the market is failing to deliver
acceptable outcomes, and where the costs of intervention are justified by the benefits to be
delivered by regulation.
Endorsing a similar approach, the British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) has
used the term “outcomes-based regulation”, which uses both principles-based and
prescriptive rules in conjunction with other regulatory tools such as compliance
monitoring, guidance, education and enforcement, with the goal of eventually reducing the
emphasis on prescriptive rules.42 It believes that risk-based regulation is a critical
component of outcomes-based regulation, not a separate regulatory goal and that regulators
should only intervene where the sole means to address a problem is regulation to
effectively remedy the problem.43
British Columbia’s 2004 proposed legislation is the best example of its outcomes-based
approach, expressly enshrining its principles and outcomes based approach in the statute.44
39

BCSC, supra, note 24 at 2.
The FSA mandate under the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is to promote efficient, orderly
and fair markets; help retail consumers achieve a fair deal; and improve business capability and effectiveness.
FSA Handbook, http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/Glossary/S, last accessed July 20, 2008.
41
The FSA has set 11 high level principles, in place since 2001: 1. A firm must conduct its business with
integrity. 2. A firm must conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence. 3. A firm must take
reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management
systems. 4. A firm must maintain adequate financial resources. 5. A firm must observe proper standards of
market conduct. 6. A firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly. 7. A firm
must pay due regard to the information needs of its clients, and communicate information to them in a way
which is clear, fair and not misleading. 8. A firm must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself
and its customers and between a customer and another client. 9. A firm must take reasonable care to ensure
the suitability of its advice and discretionary decisions for any customer who is entitled to rely upon its
judgement. 10. A firm must arrange adequate protection for clients’ assets when it is responsible for them. 11.
A firm must deal with its regulators in an open co-operative way, and must disclose to the FSA appropriately
anything relating to the firm of which the FSA would reasonably expect notice; FSA, “Principles-based
regulation – Focusing on the Outcomes that Matter,” FSA Paper, April 2007, online:
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Doing/small_firms/general/pbr/index.shtml, last accessed July 28, 2008.
42
BCSC, supra, note 24 at 2, 6.
43
Ibid. at 5.
44
British Columbia Bill 38, 2004 Securities Act, not in force, http://www.leg.bc.ca/37th5th/3rd_read/gov383.htm.
40
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While it placed its proposed legislation on hold in the interests of trying to make the
passport system work, the BCSC carries out its oversight, enforcement and policy activities
based on an outcomes-based approach. For example, the BCSC’s Service Plan 2008-2011
sets out broad principles and goals, such as promoting a culture of compliance and costeffective regulation, and then measures each of its initiatives against those goals.45
Regulatory intervention is viewed as needed only occasionally to correct non-compliance,
and the Commission’s administrative activities are directed towards supporting issuers in
their efforts to put in place effective controls and systems.46 The BCSC considers the
impact of administrative initiatives on issuers of different sizes. While its enforcement
strategy is to be rigorous, in administering the statute, the BCSC takes account of what
issuers are trying to accomplish, assessing whether an issuer is achieving the underlying
objectives of particular requirements.47 If issuers are being duly diligent in their efforts to
meet regulatory requirements, the BCSC`s compliance examination team will be flexible in
how it works with them to improve an aspect of their conduct. The BCSC applies a
scorecard to each regulatory decision; and it tracks outcomes in response to market
problems, giving credit for outcomes-focused results.48 In the BCSC’s reporting of
activities, it sets out its goals and performance measurements by specific objectives and the
annual targets for each year.49
In terms of BCSC’s approach to policy development through its work with the CSA, its
express goal is to advance cost-effective regulation, emphasizing practical solutions in
terms of a range of regulatory responses, not simply further codification.50 An example is
proposed National Instrument 31-103, Registration Requirements, which is, in part,
principles and outcomes based.51 The proposed business conduct rules set out what issuers
must achieve, setting a broad requirement to provide a relationship disclosure document to
clients, with a principles-based provision requiring registrants to provide information that a
reasonable client would consider important.52 Compliance examiners will have to assess
outcomes as opposed to measuring issuers against a prescribed list.53 Other parts of the
proposed instrument, such as compliance system requirements and complaints provisions
establish broad principles and standards, and will be measured based on the system
established and its outcomes.54
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BCSC Service Plan 2008-2011, supra, note 24 at 7-8.
Ibid. at 9.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid. at 20.
49
Ibid. at 17-20.
50
Ibid. at 14.
51
CSA, Proposed National Instrument 31-103, Registration Requirements, February 29, 2008.
52
Ibid., part 5, Conduct Rules, and NI 31-103 Notice and Request for Comments, February 29, 2008 at 11.
53
CSA, Proposed National Instrument 31-103, Registration Requirements, supra, note 51, section 5.15.
54
Ibid., sections 5.23 and 5.28. Section 5.23 specifies “(1) A registered firm must establish, maintain and
apply a system of controls and supervision sufficient to (a) provide reasonable assurance that the firm and
each individual acting on its behalf complies with securities legislation, and (b) manage the risks associated
with its business in conformity with prudent business practices. (2) The system of controls referred to in
subsection (1) must be documented in the form of written policies and procedures. Section 5.28 specifies
“5.28 A registered firm must document, and effectively and fairly respond to, each complaint made to the
registered firm about any product or service offered by the firm or a representative of the firm”.
46

20

Under a principles/standards/outcomes-based system, tools for compliance are tailored to
specific outcomes; so, arguably, there is no need for bright line, size-based regulation.
Under this model, regulators work with market participants to identify broad principles and
then the content of those principles is developed through implementation and practice.
Principles would appear to be important to set universally, regardless of size or type of
issuer. Ideally, then, the design of regulatory standards or the development of issuer
practice to meet those principles could be scalable, thus working effectively for all sizes
and/or types of issuers. To the extent that junior issuers cannot fit within one universal
standard and proportionate requirements are implemented, they would need to fit the
criteria of transparency, certainty and scalability discussed above. In this sense, regulation
could be tailored to junior issuers in particular sectors or markets and could avoid the
bright-line delineation problems discussed below.
Proportionate regulation under such a regulatory model raises the issue of whether junior
issuers have the appropriate resources or capacity to develop appropriate regulatory
practices, in the absence of tools or guidance from regulators. On the one hand, the
governance and compliance resources of junior issuers may be directed more effectively;
on the other hand, junior issuers may not have the internal expertise or the financial
resources to hire the expertise to design governance and control practices that achieve the
express regulatory principles and are responsive to the market in which they participate.
Broad practice norms evolving from principles applied on the ground need to be sensitive
to these limitations faced by junior issuers. Given that senior issuers have greater internal
expertise and resources, their practice in a particular governance or control area could
become the accepted compliance norm or threshold, creating further barriers to junior
issuer compliance.
An important consideration for principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation is that,
while junior issuers may want less regulation, they also frequently want transparency and
clarity in standards or guidance, so that they can meet the requirements in a cost effective
manner.55 There may be unnecessary costs incurred where requirements are not clear, as
junior issuers may incur the costs of additional professional opinions where they are
uncertain. This issue is particular worth considering with the introduction of secondary
market civil liability in a number of jurisdictions, in terms of officers’ fear of not “getting it
right”, notwithstanding their best intentions.
Thus, consideration of principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation on a proportionate
basis must engage those that are affected, creating opportunities for their participation in
policy discussion, guidance and tools for practice. Expectations must be clear, accessible
and relevant, based on the outcomes sought that have been articulated as public policy
goals. There must be meaningful participation by junior issuers and market participants to
improve the quality of decision making that is aimed at scaling regulation.56
55

The CSA promulgated forms under national instruments are a good example of regulators being clear on
what their expectation is for filing or disclosure.
56
Julia Black, “Involving Consumers in Securities Regulation”, in Canada Steps Up, Final Report of the IDA
Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada (2006), Volume 6 at 543,
http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(9)%20Black.pdf, last accessed June 21, 2008, citing education, information,
consultation and participation as the four main components of investor participation in the regulatory process.
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An example of mixed proportionate and principles based regulation is the AIM in the UK.57
As an exchange-regulated market, AIM is only indirectly supervised by the UK financial
sector regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), with regulatory oversight by the
London Stock Exchange (LSE).58 A junior market, AIM has a regulatory system that is
specifically tailored to the needs of small, growing companies, providing a set of less
prescriptive rules. Its hallmark of differentiated regulation by type of listing are the
Nominated Advisers (Nomads), which are investment bankers, brokers or accounting firms
that are responsible to both the companies they are advising and to the LSE for ensuring the
integrity of the market.59 Their oversight, for both entry and meeting ongoing compliance,
serves a functional alternative to prescriptive rules, but means that there is a fair degree of
oversight of junior issuer activity.
In practice, proportionate regulation on AIM has meant that, in some cases, there is no
scaled regulation and in others there is. The criteria for being admitted to AIM are less
restrictive.60 The regulation of corporate governance is less prescriptive than for
companies listed on the Main Market. Companies on the Main Market are under a ”comply
or explain” obligation with respect to the Combined Code on Corporate Governance; AIM
companies simply have to have appropriate corporate governance structures. However,
Nomads are required to work with directors to ensure adoption of appropriate corporate
governance measures that accord with the principles of existing codes.61 AIM’s rationale
for proportionate requirements is that young, growth companies should not be impeded by
unnecessarily rigid or inappropriate restrictions on their internal operations; rather, investor
protection is met by Nomads ensuring that the company acts appropriately, coupled with
enhanced disclosure to investors through new AIM Rules for Companies, effective
February 2007.62 Companies admitted to AIM are subject to the same ongoing obligations
for disclosure and transaction reporting that apply to the Main Market, though there are
some differences. Investors are warned in disclosures that due to its less prescriptive
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Companies admitted to trading on AIM are UK companies, foreign companies, UK registered holding
companies, particularly in the oil, gas and mining sectors, and closed-end property and investment funds.
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Sridhar Arcot, Julia Black and Geoffrey Owen, From Local to Global, The Rise of AIM as a Stock Market
for Growing Companies, September 2007, www.londonstockexchange.com/aim. Under provisions of EU law
implemented November 2007, AIM’s regulatory status changed to being a multi-lateral trading facility
operated by the Exchange, ibid. at 9.
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Ibid. at 12. There are currently 76 registered Nomads, although 30 Nomads are appointed to around 80 per
cent of AIM companies. In 2006, AIM introduced new Rules for Nomads in order to emphasize and clarify
their obligations; AIM Rules for Nominated Advisors (RN). To become a Nomad, both firms and individuals
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60
For example, there are no minimum capital requirements and no requirement for the company to have been
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companies that have been trading is the same as for the Main Market; AIM Notice 24 (October 2006) and
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Ibid. AIM RN r.18, Sched 3 AR2.
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Ibid. at 22. The regulation over the LSE, and thus AIM, changed significantly in 2006 and 2007, partly to
meet changes in EU law, notably the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).
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regulation, investing in AIM companies is more risky than investing in equities listed on
the Main Market.63
With respect to the FSA’s direct regulatory oversight (primarily investment firms), it uses a
risk-based approach. The system is evolving, in that rules continue to exist as the FSA
moves to a more principles-based approach to regulation, but as firms interpret principles,
they can be exempt from compliance with the rules if they can demonstrate that their
practice is achieving the public policy principle. The FSA uses different methodology for
assessing small firm outcomes.64 While its model is not directly applicable to Canada in
that the 18,000 small firms that the FSA oversees are largely investment firms with
considerably more market expertise than Canadian junior issuers, it nevertheless illustrates
some broad policy choices.65 The FSA approach is that regulation should be proportionate,
risk-based, evidence-based, and properly designed so that they achieve specified
outcomes.66 On this basis, the FSA directs less regulatory energy or resources to small
firms because they are of comparatively lower risk to investors and the market. The FSA
articulates principles, such as duty of care towards customers, and then uses a number of
tools to identify firms most at risk of non-compliance and to minimize incentives small
firms may have to be non-complaint, with a mix of communication, education, supervision
and enforcement, setting key milestones for small retail firms.67 Its aim is a “rigorous
regulatory environment for UK financial services, but with more effective regulation and
“outcome focused rules”.68 Its focus is on “sign posts” or guidance on controls. For
63

Ibid. at 24. In 2007, the FSA has also acquired new powers to review rules of the LSE, to ensure that the
rules preserve the UK’s proportionate and risk-based approach to financial services regulation. The rules
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FSA Handbook, http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/Glossary/S, last accessed July 27, 2008.
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example, it currently has embarked on a three-year enhanced strategy aimed at helping
small firms achieve its policy goal of “Treating Customers Fairly”. By December 2008,
firms must: demonstrate that senior management have instilled a culture within the firm
regarding fair treatment of customers, and how errors are promptly found and remedied.
They must demonstrate that they have implemented appropriate and accurate measuring of
performance against customer fairness issues materially relevant to their business.69 The
FSA reports that it takes tough enforcement action by focusing on and dealing more visibly
with a targeted group of firms that are failing to deliver fair treatment of customers.70
Education is an important part of the FSA’s small firm strategy, with interactive roadshows
linked to its regional assessment program and case studies as models of good practice.71
The FSA’s approach to proportionate regulation has several hallmarks. Its approach is to
set broad principles that it wants to achieve, and then impose standards or milestones. It
dedicates fewer regulatory resources to small firms based on risk assessment. It exempts
firms from regulatory compliance based on their practice, rather than blanket exemptions
based on size of issuer. In the Canadian context, such an approach may mean assessing
each new policy instrument to assess what the policy objective is and whether a proposed
standard for junior issuers does anything to advance that objective, based on risks to
investors and risk to market competitiveness. Given the number of junior issuers in the
Canadian market, allocation of education, compliance and enforcement resources would
have to recognize the size and materiality of the junior market and recognize that such
issuers may pose a lower risk to regulatory misconduct. Moreover, the expertise of the
investment firms to which the FSA’s approach applies may be more sophisticated in terms
of its ability to set milestones, and the experience, while informative, may not be directly
responsive to challenges faced by junior issuers in public equity markets.
A principles/standards/outcomes based regulatory approach should be accompanied by
rigorous enforcement of securities law and regulation. Fewer and less prescriptive rules
should not mean less rigorous enforcement. Canadian securities regulators already engage
in risk-based assessment and enforcement; specifically, they adopt differing levels of
scrutiny based on risk, materiality and proportionality. However, principles/standards/
outcomes based regulatory approach might mean that regulators use a range of tools, as the
FSA has, in finding solutions to an identified market problem or stated goal, including
guidance, education, public participation in setting expectations, monitoring and
enforcement. Such an approach may treat junior issuers differently, depending on the issue,
but the driver of policy choice is what is most effective and cost efficient as opposed to
regulation by type of issuer.
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The BCSC has previously suggested that a properly designed outcomes-based regime will
provide sensible outcomes for all market participants without having to devise separate
regimes.72 It observed that disadvantages include the difficulty in getting the correct
thresholds between classes of issuers and that “even if it works most of the time, the regime
spins off a welter of exemption applications as issuers who should be in one category find
themselves in a different one.” It was also concerned that there is a risk that issuers
regulated in the less rigorous categories would be seen as less desirable investments. Its
view is that less regulation, if replaced by outcomes-based requirements, properly
implemented and supervised by the regulator, actually increases investor protection.73
Risk-based enforcement systems are essentially the end-part of a proportionate regulation
system, in that choices are made in respect of the highest priorities for monitoring and
enforcement. How these choices interact with front-end regulatory and disclosure
requirements has an impact on the overall efficacy and fairness of the regulatory regime. If
standards or expectations are not clear, principles-based systems can offer challenges for
junior issuers, who want clarity in what is expected of them.
(d)

Cross-Border Harmonization

Another consideration for proportionate regulation is continued access to US and other
international markets. Since 1990, the SEC and Canada’s securities regulators have
participated in the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System that permits issuers in the US
and Canada to more easily access each other’s markets. Currently, the SEC and Canadian
securities regulators are in discussions for a potential US-Canada mutual recognition
arrangement.74 Harmonization with the US is unlikely given the different structure of the
respective capital markets and different normative views of the extent of rules needed.
Mutual recognition is more feasible, whereby regulators rely on their counterparts in other
countries where two systems have comparable goals. Under mutual recognition, US
exchanges would be able to operate in Canada under US rules and regulations, and
Canadian exchanges would be able to operate in the US under Canadian rules, regulation
and oversight.75
The purpose of “free trade” in securities is to lower costs through the efficiencies that are
realized in the reduction of dual regulation and regulatory overlap, resulting in increased
liquidity, better valuations and more dynamic markets.76 Another aspect of mutual
recognition is the move by Canada to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS);
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the US proposes to allow foreign companies in the US to use IFRS without requiring
reconciliation with US GAAP.77 The pursuit of mutual recognition is unlikely to be
harmed by the continued introduction of proportionate regulation as many Canadian issuers
are within the US definition of small cap.

5. Delineating Issuers for Regulatory Purposes
The second policy question is whether size, type of exchange listing, or some other
criterion should be the determinant of how proportionate regulation is structured. A
critically important policy question is how to delineate which issuers fall within a category
of issuers that are entitled to different regulatory treatment.78 The distinctions may involve
different standards of disclosure or other compliance, or outright exemption from some
regulatory requirements for particular specified issuers. Here again, principles of
transparency, fairness and certainty underlay any policy choices.
The delineation could be by market type of exchange on which issuers are listed; by
capitalization; by revenue; or some combination.
(a) Type of Listing Approach
One option is to scale regulatory requirements based on the type of exchange that the issuer
is listed on. In Canada, that distinction has been made based on listing with the Toronto
Stock Exchange (TSX) or comparable exchange, such as the NYSE, versus listing on the
TSX Venture Exchange (TSXV) or similar exchange, such as the AIM. Under several
national instruments, venture issuer is defined as: “a reporting issuer that, as at the
applicable time, did not have any of its securities listed or quoted on any of the Toronto
Stock Exchange, a U.S. marketplace, or a marketplace outside of Canada and the United
States of America other than the Alternative Investment Market of the London Stock
Exchange or the PLUS markets operated by PLUS Markets Group plc”.79 Thus, the
distinction for purposes of proportionate regulation is venture issuer in the junior market
versus non-venture issuer in the senior market, rather than distinguishing based on size.
The TMX Group has characterized the distinct nature of the TSXV in the following way:
The TSX Venture market is unique in its own right. It has had a long history of
small issuers successfully raising small amounts of public capital at an earlier
stage than senior market issuers. These are higher risk enterprises, both in terms
of business risk but also in terms of the absence of classical internal controls,
77
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such as segregation of duties. While there are compensating controls such as
management supervisory controls, shareholders know and accept that those
controls are thoroughly dependent on trust in officer and director integrity and
tone at the top. This market has its own listing, corporate governance and other
requirements that are tailored to emerging companies. This market is branded
separately from the senior market, which among other things, provides a brightline notice to investors of the distinct and higher risk profile of this market. …
The corporate governance and financial reporting securities law requirements
that apply to TSX Venture listed issuers are more robust than similar
requirements that apply to issuers on AIM or ASX. Generally, TSX Venture
issuers must comply with more stringent requirements covering, among other
things, audit committee composition, including independence and financial
literacy requirements and quarterly financial reporting requirements.80
The TSXV monitors listed issuers on an ongoing basis, and if they fall below its ongoing
listing standards, the issuers are moved to a separate trading board of the TSXV, the
NEX.81 Industry participants are thus alerted to the higher risk profile of the issuer,
pending efforts by the issuer to refinance, restructure, reactivate, engage in a reverse
takeover, or other measures to eventually graduate to TSXV. NEX issuers must re-apply to
TSXV and provide evidence of their compliance with TSXV listing requirements.82
Venture issuers are also monitored for compliance by the Investment Industry Regulatory
Organization of Canada (IIROC). IIROC monitors trading activity on the TSXV and other
marketplaces in Canada and enforces non-compliance with universal market integrity rules,
including imposing trading halts, administering and monitoring compliance with TSXV
policies on timely disclosure requirements, unacceptable trading practices, suspected
breaches of TSXV trading activity, take-over, substantial issuer and normal course issuer
bids, and other requirements.83 The objective is independent, timely and effective
enforcement to advance investor protection and market integrity.
Thus, junior issuers on the TSXV pose higher risk, but not from the lack of regulatory
scrutiny; rather, because of the inherently developmental nature of many of the activities of
these issuers.
The advantage of a listing approach to distinguishing issuers for purposes of proportionate
regulation is its transparency for investors and ease of monitoring. For example, there are
different kinds of compliance requirements depending on whether the issuer is listed on the
TSX or the TSXV, and depending on the type of issuer, such as capital pool companies or
venture issuers. Such a bifurcation recognizes the stage of development of the firm and the
80
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challenges for junior companies.84 Differences in regulation are independent of the issuer’s
size or market capitalization, but rather, dependent on the location of its listing. A
principal reason that the TSX and regulators have distinguished requirements is their
recognition that junior issuers often lack the resources or in-house expertise to which larger
corporations have access.
Canadian securities regulators have already recognized some measure of proportionate
regulation in their national instruments based on the type of listing. Three examples are
illustrative: corporate governance disclosure; continuous disclosure requirements; and the
proposed new officer certification national instrument.
(i) Corporate Governance Disclosure
Pursuant to NI 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, there is
proportionate regulation in respect of the amount of disclosure required from non-venture
and venture issuers.85 For example, while both types of issuers are to disclose the identity
of independent and non-independent directors, and describe the basis for that
determination, the requirements for non-venture issuers are considerably more detailed.86
Non-venture issuers must disclose board attendance records; and the identity, role and
responsibilities of the independent chair or lead director, or, if the board does not have one,
how it provides leadership for its independent directors.87 Non-venture issuers must
describe what the board of directors does to facilitate its exercise of independent judgment
in carrying out its responsibilities if a majority of directors are not independent; disclose
whether or not independent directors hold regularly scheduled in-camera meetings,
including particulars on the number of meetings and what the board does to facilitate
candid discussion. Venture issuers do not face such requirements. Venture issuers are also
not required to disclose the board's written mandate or delineation of board roles and
responsibilities; nor required to disclose written position descriptions or delineated roles for
the board chair and chair of each board committee, whereas senior issuers are.88 All
reporting issuers must disclose director orientation and continuing education initiatives, but
only non-venture issuers must describe how the board ensures that its directors maintain the
skill and knowledge necessary to meet their obligations as directors.89
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While venture issuers must disclose what steps, if any, the board takes to encourage and
promote a culture of ethical business conduct,90 non-venture issuers must provide
considerably more detailed disclosure, including adoption and monitoring of a written code
of conduct; providing cross-references to any material change report that pertains to
conduct of a director or executive officer that constitutes a departure from the code; and
any steps the board takes to ensure directors exercise independent judgment in considering
transactions where a director or executive officer has a material interest.91 While both
types of issuers must describe how the board satisfies itself that the board and individual
directors are performing effectively, non-venture issuers must describe the process used for
director and board assessments.92 Similarly, disclosures in respect of nomination and
compensation of directors are more detailed for non-venture issuers than venture issuers.93
Hence, in respect of corporate governance disclosures, proportionate regulation involves
modified requirements in scope, breadth and detail of required corporate disclosure and
systems. Venture issuers must undertake the above-mentioned disclosures, but are not
required to provide details. Where a non-venture issuer board does not have formal
policies and practices in place, it must disclose initiatives that it has undertaken to ensure
independence and objectivity in the process. In a sense, therefore, NI 58-101 has identified
the key elements of corporate governance that must be disclosed, regardless of the type of
listing or size or sophistication of the issuer. Equally, however, it has recognized that
relational management is a feature of many venture issuers, and while there are disclosure
requirements in respect of the assurance of board effectiveness, there is no need for the
venture issuer to measure itself against more codified best practices that are appropriate for
senior issuers, which often require the establishment of systems and controls to encourage
the integrity of business conduct.
The initiatives of securities regulators have been adopted by the TMX Group, which has
amended its corporate governance disclosure requirements to align with NI 58-101.94 The
TSX is more generally revising its manual to align new regulatory requirements under
national instruments with listing requirements.
(ii) Continuous Disclosure Obligations
NI 51-102, Continuous Disclosure Obligations, is another example of proportionate
regulation by type of listing, recognizing different requirements for venture and non90
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venture reporting issuers.95 Proportionate requirements include, most notably, different
filing deadlines for annual and interim financial statements and specified exemptions from
some disclosure requirements for junior and senior reporting issuers. NI 51-102 specifies
that non-venture issuers must file audited annual financial statements within 90 days after
the end of its most recently completed financial year; venture issuers have 120 days.96
Deadlines for filing interim financial statements are 45 days for non-venture issuers and 60
days for venture issuers after the end of the interim period.97
This modification of regulation through different reporting timelines, as a policy choice,
can be compared with the AIM’s frequency of disclosure, where small issuers are required
to give only annual and semi-annual financial statements. Frequency is an option to
consider, in that if investors are not reading quarterly results, it may be that junior issuers
could be exempted. However, any exemption can only be effective if the integrity of the
issuer and the market were assured. If it appears to investors that junior issuers are being
downgraded in terms of oversight or compliance, then such a change will not meet the
express goals of the regulatory system. The issue is what periodic disclosure is really
relevant to investors and potential investors and how frequently they want an update on that
relevant information.
Venture issuers in Canada are exempted from filing an AIF.98 Venture issuers are also
exempted from specified disclosure requirements under NI 51-102, such as filing a report
on matters submitted to a vote at a meeting of securityholders.99 Under liquidity
disclosures, issuers are required to discuss balance sheet conditions or income or cash flow
items in a summary and tabular form, but venture issuers do not have to provide the
summary and table.100 Venture issuers do not have to provide an analysis of their critical
accounting estimates as non-venture issuers do.101 Pursuant to Form 51-102F6, Statement
of Executive Compensation, there are also different disclosure requirements in respect of
stock appreciation rights (SAR), in that venture issues do not have to make a number of
specified disclosures that non-venture issuers do.102 However, a venture issuer must
disclose which grants of options or SARs result from repricing and explain in reasonable
detail the basis for the repricing.103
While all reporting issuers are required to file a business acquisition report (BAR) within
75 days after the date of a significant acquisition, NI 51-102 sets different filing deadlines
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if the most recently completed financial year of the acquired business ended 45 days or less
before the date of acquisition, in which case a reporting issuer must file a BAR within 90
days after the date of acquisition, but a venture issuer has 120 days.104 There are also
different tests for venture and non-venture issuers in respect of what is defined as a
significant acquisition; specifically, the asset test, the investment test, or the income test,
where 20 per cent is read as 40 per cent for venture issuers.105
NI 51-102 also imposes increased disclosure requirements on venture issuers in at least one
circumstance. Venture issuers, without significant revenue in the prior two financial years,
must disclosure in their MD&A capitalized or expensed exploration and development
costs, expensed research and development costs, and deferred development costs.106 The
objective is to focus venture issuers’ discussion and analysis of results of operations on
expenditures and progress towards achieving business objectives and milestones.107
Certain venture issuers must provide, in their annual or interim MD&A, a breakdown of
material costs whether capitalized, deferred or expensed.108
Within the type of listing approach, there is also a demarcation for particular issuers, such
as capital pool companies.109 Regulators have an agreement with the TSXV, which is
aimed at addressing barriers to early financing, allowing a capital pool company to list on
the TSXV subject to specific conditions.110 It establishes a program under which a CPC
may conduct an initial public offering by prospectus and obtain a listing on TSX Venture's
Tier 2. The program requires the CPC to identify and complete a Qualifying Transaction
(QT) within a specified period of time after listing.111 The TSXV administers the CPC
program and reviews the prospectuses and QT Circulars. The agreement with regulators
sets out the standards that the TSXV will apply.
Hence, this second example illustrates four types of proportionate regulation: exemption
from particular disclosure requirements, scaled timing for compliance with periodic
disclosure requirements, modified requirements in terms of details to be disclosed, and
“tailored” requirements, such as MD&A exploration and development disclosure
requirements for venture issuers without significant revenue in the prior two financial
104
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years.112 The delineation by type of listing does not result in less rigorous requirements;
rather, they are proportionate to the type of issuer, its capacity to make periodic disclosure
on a timely basis, and more focussed in terms of being aimed at what the particular investor
needs to know to make investment choices. In this respect, disclosure requirements could
focus more clearly on junior issuers. Given the fact that many junior issuers do not
generate much, if any, revenue, timely information such as drill results, clinical trial results,
and approval of mineral licenses can be more important than financial statements in making
investment decisions.113
(iii) Certification of Disclosure
The third and most recent example of proportionate regulation in Canada is the proposed
NI 52-109, Certification Disclosure in Issuer’s Annual and Interim Filings, expected to
come into force effective December 15, 2008.114 Here, after earlier failed attempts to build
national consensus on the scope of officer certification and whether Canada should adopt
S-Ox 404 standards,115 the CSA has succeeded in finding a proportionate response to the
need for some sort of assurances by senior officers without the expense of external auditor
attestation.
NI 52-109 requires an issuer’s chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer
(CFO), or persons performing similar functions (certifying officers), to personally certify
that the issuer’s annual and interim filings do not contain any misrepresentations; and that
the financial statements and other financial information in the annual and interim filings
fairly present the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer.
They must also certify that they have designed or supervised the design of disclosure
controls and procedures (DC&P) and internal control over financial reporting (ICFR); they
have caused the issuer to disclose in its MD&A any change in the issuer’s ICFR that has
materially affected the issuer’s ICFR; and, on an annual basis, that they have evaluated the
effectiveness of the issuer’s DC&P and caused the issuer to disclose their conclusions in
the issuer’s MD&A. In anticipation of these changes, in November 2007, nine Canadian
regulators issued blanket orders that had the effect of modifying the current certification
requirements as they apply to venture issuers as set out in the Instrument.116
112
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The most important aspect of proportionate regulation by type of listing in proposed NI 52109 is that the instrument creates a new form of certificate for junior issuers, a "venture
issuer basic certificate," in which certifying officers of venture issuers are not required to
include representations in their certificates relating to the establishment and maintenance of
DC&P and ICFR; whereas non-venture issuers are required to use a control framework in
the design of ICFR.117 The venture issuer basic certificate includes a note to investors and
others reading the materials explaining how it differs from the full certificate required to be
filed by reporting non-venture issuers. A venture issuer filing a basic certificate is not
required to discuss in its annual or interim MD&A the design or operating effectiveness of
DC&P or ICFR.118 Venture issuers can still choose to file full certificates. Hence, the
venture issuer basic certificate meets the express objectives of securities law, in that it is
transparent in terms of disclosures to investors and others as to how it differs from the full
certificate. It modifies the certification requirements to recognize the type of issuer and its
limited resources, and to recognize what investors are seeking to know about financial
controls in assessing potential risk and return. It recognizes that those investing in venture
issuers may wish their capital to be directed towards development and economic activity of
the issuer, rather than governance or financial assurances, while still imposing a relatively
high standard of assurances.
Proposed NI 52-109 also requires that non-venture issuers use a control framework to
design their ICFR, whereas venture issuers are not required.119 The CSA also suggested
that smaller issuers can refer to Internal Control over Financial Reporting – Guidance for
Instrument 52-109, effective November 27, 2007; Manitoba Blanket Order No. 52-501 Relief for Venture
Issuers from Certain Certification Requirement, effective November 23, 2007; Québec DÉCISION N° 2007PDG-0203 Règlement 52-109 sur l’attestation de l’information présentée dans les documents annuels et
intermédiaires des émetteurs, effective November 23, 2007; Newfoundland Blanket Order 55 In the Matter of
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17, 2008; NT Blanket Order No. 10 In the Matter of Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of
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Smaller Public Companies published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
(COSO), for guidance to smaller public companies on the implementation of the COSO
Framework.120 This suggestion raises an important consideration in respect of the
venture/non-venture issuer delineation. There are a number of small issuers on the TSX
that are subjected to the full regulatory requirements of NI 52-109. If all issuers on the
TSX or similar exchanges must comply with the more detailed requirements, such as
control frameworks, regardless of capitalization, then it may be appropriate to provide
greater guidance in respect of what such frameworks could entail, recognizing that there
are different size issuers on the TSX. Here again, there could be a proportionate approach
in that smaller issuers listed on the TSX do not necessarily need the “Cadillac” version of
control frameworks, given their governance and oversight structure. Rather than a different
regulatory standard, it could take the form of assistance in designing a range of control
frameworks sensitive to size and sector.
Proposed NI 52-109 also makes a distinction between non-venture issuers and venture
issuers in terms of new requirements to report material weakness in internal controls.
“Material weakness” means a deficiency or combination of deficiencies in ICFR such that
there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the reporting issuer’s annual
or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.121 If a
non-venture issuer determines it has a material weakness that exists as at the end of the
period covered by its annual or interim filings, it must disclose in its annual or interim
MD&A a description of the material weakness; its impact on the issuer’s financial
reporting and its ICFR; and the issuer’s plans or actions already undertaken for remediating
the material weakness.
A venture issuer is not required to file an AIF; however, if it voluntarily files an AIF, it
must file a separate annual certificate signed by a certifying office on the same date that it
files the AIF.122 Under the venture issuer basic certificate, the certifying officer must
certify that he or she has reviewed the AIF, if any, annual financial statements and annual
MD&A, including all documents and information that are incorporated by reference; and
based on the officer’s knowledge, having exercised reasonable diligence, certify that these
annual filings do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact required to be stated or that is necessary to make a statement not misleading in
light of the circumstances under which it was made, for the period covered by the annual
filings.123 The officer must also certify that based on his or her knowledge, having
exercised reasonable diligence, the annual financial statements together with the other
120
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financial information included in the annual filings fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the issuer.
The proposed note to readers that will be required specifies that, in contrast to the
certificate required for non-venture issuers under NI 52-109, the Venture Issuer Basic
Certificate does not include representations relating to the establishment and maintenance
of DC&P and ICFR, and the certifying officers filing the certificate are not making any
representations relating to the establishment and maintenance of controls designed to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with the issuer’s
GAAP.124 The explanatory note is to alert investors that limitations on the ability of
certifying officers of a venture issuer to design and implement on a cost effective basis
DC&P and ICFR may result in additional risks to the quality, reliability, transparency and
timeliness of interim and annual filings and other reports provided under securities
legislation.125 Certification of annual and interim filings following an initial public
offering, reverse takeover or becoming a non-venture issuer, contains similar scaled
requirements and an abbreviated similar note to readers.126
Venture issuers are not required to make representations relating to the establishment and
maintenance of DC&P and ICFR. However, a venture issuer may elect to file Forms 52109F1 or 52-109F2, which include representations regarding the establishment and
maintenance of DC&P and ICFR. If a venture issuer files these forms, it is not required to
discuss in its annual or interim MD&A the design or operating effectiveness of DC&P or
ICFR, but it is suggested by the CSA that it disclose that it is not required to certify the
design and evaluation of the issuer’s DC&P and ICFR, and set out the inherent limitations
and risks. The Companion Policy to NI 52-109 observes that a selective discussion in a
venture issuer’s MD&A about one or more components of a venture issuer’s DC&P or
ICFR without these accompanying statements will not provide transparent disclosure of the
state of the venture issuer’s DC&P or ICFR.127
Hence, this example of proportionate regulation illustrates differentiated standards, with a
clear caution to investors that a policy line has been drawn in terms of the degree and detail
of assurances by certifying officers, depending on whether the issuer is a venture or nonventure issuer. The Venture Issuer Basic Certificate draws a bright line distinction,
creating transparency for investors in terms of what expectations they may have about
officer assurance.
The modified requirements were responsive to market participants that want venture issuers
to place their resources into effective management and good project development, more
than highly codified internal corporate governance controls that may not adequately
balance access to capital for research and development with investor protection. The
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distinction is differently focused regulation, as opposed to less rigorous standards. The
underlying policy rationale is that many venture issuers have few employees and limited
financial resources, which make it difficult for them to design DC&P and ICFR without
incurring significant additional costs, hiring additional employees, or restructuring the
board of directors and audit committee. Moreover, the higher risks frequently associated
with venture issuers are the quality of the project and personnel; and thus regulatory
intervention should be proportionate and responsive to the need for this disclosure
foremost.
In summary, the advantage of a type of listing delineation for proportionate regulation is its
transparency. Currently, given the structure of the Canadian capital market, 97 per cent of
the total aggregate Canadian market capitalization is comprised of issuers listed on the TSX
or TSXV.128 The concentration of the Canadian market on two exchanges allows for ease
of demarcation for the purposes of proportionate regulation. Canadian regulators have
already opted for this delineation in several national instruments. It creates a measure of
fairness in that all issuers on an exchange are treated alike and investors can readily make
choices based on the degree of disclosure and compliance assurances. There is also
transparency in the delineation for regulators, in terms of monitoring and enforcement. The
transition from one set of requirements is clear; specifically, when an issuer moves to a
new exchange. Such an approach has not, to date, harmed access to the US market, as
overall the size of issuers on the TSXV is considerably smaller than the US delineation of
small issuer, discussed below. The venture/non-venture delineation allows issuers the
freedom to choose what set of compliance rules they wish, depending on their listing.
The type of listing distinction also recognizes the regulatory oversight of the junior equities
market in Canada. The TSXV imposes financial listing tests, ongoing listing rules, audit
committee requirements, and thorough background checks on directors and officers, in
terms of their relevant business experience, public company experience and history of legal
and financial regulatory compliance, offering a more rigorous regulatory oversight than
some other junior exchanges.129 Hence, it is appropriate to adopt regulatory requirements
that acknowledge this oversight.
The venture/non-venture issuer delineation is unlikely to create incentive effects in terms of
issuers not being willing to move up to the senior exchange. Both the TSX and TSXV
have solidly increasing reputations, and institutional and other investors are increasingly
willing to invest in venture companies. While the objective of many companies on the
TSXV is to move to the TSX, the new proportionate requirements may mean that they
remain on the TSXV for a greater period of time, graduating, for example, in a year to 15
months instead of three to six months. However, the fact that they may be in less of a hurry
to acquire the additional governance and disclosure requirements could be viewed as a
positive aspect of a proportionate approach, in that such issuers are likely to move only
when they have appropriate controls and resources in place to comply with the new
requirements. Generally, where the venture issuer is qualified to graduate, it will do so, as
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graduation is important to its capital raising activities.130 Arguably, any additional time
that the venture issuer needs to enhance its internal capacity with respect to financial
controls, governance and disclosure is also of benefit to investors, who will understand the
different risks associated with the issuer, advancing the goals of investor protection.
The disadvantage may be for smaller issuers on the TSX, who may have the same market
capitalization as a TSXV issuer, but face a different set of regulatory requirements, thus
raising the question of fairness. These issuers may face disproportionate governance
requirements in terms of time and resources, when the requirements are not responsive to
legislative and regulatory goals.
With this basis for proportionate regulation, as for the options that follow, public education
is required for all market participants, particularly potential investors. There needs to be
clear understanding of how regulation has been scaled and what it means to investors in
assessing their risk capacity. For example, the TSX has continually upgraded its education
and mentorship programs, so that issuers meet regulatory compliance and investors
understand the market and business risks associated with different kinds of investment.
(b) Market Capitalization or Market Float Approach
A second option is to delineate the type of issuer by size. Such a demarcation for purposes
of proportionate regulation could be by market capitalization or public float; or as
discussed below, by consolidated revenue. There would need to be a nationally prescribed
standardized methodology for computing size, whatever approach adopted.
The market capitalization approach offers some transparency in that market capitalization
information is publicly available. The US has adopted the notion of public float, i.e.
market capitalization excluding company officers, directors, or controlling-interest
investors, for greater ease and transparency, as discussed below. If a market capitalization
approach were to be adopted for purposes of proportionate regulation in Canada, there
would have to be clear transition rules specifying how companies would graduate from the
microcap or smallcap category to non-small company status, in terms of timing, in order to
ensure fairness of when exactly a company becomes subject to scaled regulatory
requirements, and transparency for investors. Given that market capitalization can
fluctuate, companies could arguably hover on either side of a market cap bright line, and
thus should be measured as of a specified annual date. While this option would assist with
transparency, it may give rise to some incentives to manipulate market capitalization to fall
within particular compliance requirements or incentives to not grow the company, creating
a measure of unfairness for investors. A key disadvantage of the market capitalization
approach is that choice of regulatory regime is removed from the issuer, as the market
determines the issuers’ value.
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(i) Market Capitalization
The SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies in 2006 reported that
proportionality as an underlying principle of US securities regulation had been
underemphasized, and made a series of recommendations for proportionate regulation.131 It
recommended regulating based on a stratification of smaller public companies into two
groups, microcap companies and smallcap companies. Its proposed a system of
proportionate securities regulation for smaller public companies that would use six
determinants to define a “smaller public company”: the total market capitalization of the
company; a measurement metric that facilitates the scaling of regulation; a measurement
metric that is self-calibrating; a standardized measurement and methodology for computing
market capitalization; a date for determining total market capitalization; and clear and firm
transition rules.132
The Committee recommended the use of market capitalization, rather than public float,
which US regulators have traditionally used to determine eligibility for smaller public
company treatment, because it concluded that market capitalization better measures total
financial exposure to investors and the US capital markets than public float. Its view was
that market capitalization has the advantage of simplicity, as it avoids the sometimes
difficult problem of deciding for legal purposes which holdings are public float and which
are not.133
The Committee recommended the development of proportionate regulation for companies
if they qualify as “microcap companies” because their equity market capitalization places
them in the lowest 1 per cent of total US equity market capitalization or as “smallcap
companies” because their market capitalization places them in the next lowest 1 per cent to
5 per cent of total U.S. market capitalization.134 The Committee summarized the US
market as follows in its Table 1:
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Table: Recommendation on Scaled or Proportionate Regulation for Smaller Public Companies
Market Capitalization
Percentage of Total
Percentage of All U.S.
Cutoff
U.S. Market
Public Companies
Capitalization
Microcap
<US$128.2 million
1%
52.6%
Companies
Smallcap
US$128.2-US$787.1 million
5%
25.9%
Companies
Smaller Public
<US$787.1 million
6%
78.5%
Companies
Larger Public
Companies

>US$787.1 million

94%

21.5%

Note that its definition of small cap is set at a considerably higher threshold than in Canada,
where SMEs are viewed as a market capitalization of CDN$500 million or less.135 The
differences are due to the smaller size of Canada’s capital market and the fact that
Canadian issuers tend to access the public equity market at a much earlier stage of their
growth than companies in the US.136
The Committee’s rationale for recommending proportionate regulation for companies
falling in the lowest 6 per cent of total US equity market capitalization is that 94 per cent of
the total US public equity capital market would still have the full benefit and protection of
federal securities regulation for companies, limiting risk to investors of serious losses.137
The Committee recommended the promulgation of regulations under which all US
companies with equity securities registered under the Exchange Act would be ranked from
largest to smallest market capitalization based on a periodic recalculation date. Companies
would self-determine whether they qualify for microcap and smallcap company treatment
for the next fiscal year by comparing their market capitalization on the last day of their
previous fiscal year. Hence, the measurement metric for determining smaller public
company status would be “self-calibrating.”138 The Committee did not recommend the
frequency with which the recalculation should occur, but noted that frequent recalculation,
even on an annual basis, could introduce an undesirable level of uncertainty into the
process for companies trying to determine where they fall within the three categories.139
However, its view was that the recalculation period avoids the problem of setting a dollar
amount standard that needs to be continually revisited, providing a long-term solution to
the problem of re-scaling securities regulation for smaller public companies every few
years.140
The Committee concluded that the benefits of documenting, testing and certifying the
adequacy of internal controls, while of importance for large issuers, are of less certain
value for smaller public companies, who rely to a greater degree on the “tone at the top”
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and high-level monitoring controls to facilitate accurate financial reporting, finding that
“the result is a cost/benefit equation that, many believe, diminishes shareholder value,
makes smaller public companies less attractive as investment opportunities and impedes
their ability to compete”.141 The Committee observed that the primary objective of
internal control over financial reporting requirements should be the prevention of
materially inaccurate financial statements; however, different sized companies operate
differently, and internal control rules should reflect this fact.142 It recommended that, in
implementing new accounting standards, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) should permit microcap companies to apply the same extended effective dates that
it provides for private companies.143 The Committee recommended implementing a de
minimis provision in the application of the SEC’s auditor independence rules.144
In implementing some of the recommended changes of the Committee, the SEC chose to
retain public float as the delineation for proportionate regulation, instead of market
capitalization.
(ii) Public Float
Public float is largely a US regulatory concept adjusting market capitalization; essentially it
is the portion of a company's outstanding shares that is held by public investors, as opposed
to company officers, directors or controlling-interest investors. Public float has been used
in the US as the delineation for proportionate regulation. Effective February 2008, the SEC
has adopted a new system of disclosure rules for smaller companies filing periodic reports
and registration statements with the SEC.145 It has expanded the number of companies that
qualify for its scaled disclosure requirements for smaller reporting companies.146
Under the new system, smaller reporting companies will prepare and file their SEC reports
and registration statements using the same forms as other SEC reporting companies, though
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the information required to be disclosed will differ.147 Under the new rules, companies
qualify as “smaller reporting companies,” and therefore for scaled disclosure, if they have a
common equity public float of less than US$75 million, which will be the eligibility for
most issuers. Alternatively, for companies that are unable to calculate public float, the SEC
has provided a revenue test. If a company has no common equity outstanding or no market
price for its outstanding common equity at the time of its eligibility determination, the
company would qualify as a smaller reporting company if it had less than US$50 million in
revenues in the last fiscal year. These standards differ from the standards that governed
eligibility for the SEC’s former small company disclosure requirements, which were
available to “small business issuers,” that had less than US$25 million in public float and
less than US$25 million in annual revenue.148
Setting the public float ceiling at US$75 million for smaller reporting companies further
aligned the smaller reporting company definition with the SEC’s non-accelerated filer
definition. The SEC has concluded that this standard is appropriately scaled in that it
reduces costs to smaller companies caused by unnecessary information requirements,
consistent with investor protection.149 The SEC reports that by eliminating the revenue test
for most companies, the new definition of smaller reporting company simplifies and
streamlines the definition while expanding the number of companies eligible to qualify.150
All companies calculate their public float as of the last business day of their second fiscal
quarter. The amendments are scaled to reflect the characteristics and needs of smaller
companies and their investors.151
The SEC rejected the Advisory Committee’s recommendation to move to market
capitalization as the measure of size, as it concluded that requiring only a public float test
for most companies to qualify would provide additional simplicity, consistency and
certainty; and that eliminating a revenue test would broaden the category of eligible
companies. Its decision to focus on a company’s non-affiliate common equity market
capitalization or ‘‘public float’’ was also consistent with the SEC’s current regulatory
standards for the purposes of Forms 10–K Annual Reporting and S–3 Registration
Statements and the accelerated filer definition.152
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The SEC has also acknowledged the need for proportionate regulation in the context of
Sarbanes-Oxley section 404, auditor attestation requirements.153 It accepted, in part, the
Committee’s recommendation that the SEC provide exemptive relief to microcap and
smallcap companies until a framework for assessing the internal control over financial
reporting for such companies is developed that recognizes their characteristics and
needs.154 The SEC announced in June 2008 that it has further extended the compliance date
for smaller public companies (non-accelerated filers), defined as those with less than
US$75 million in public float, to meet the Section 404(b) auditor attestation requirement of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act by one year, for annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after
December 15, 2009.155 In the interim, the SEC will collect data on the costs and benefits of
Section 404 implementation, focusing on the consequences for smaller companies and the
effects of the Section 404 auditor attestation requirements.156 The extension of the Section
404 compliance date for smaller companies is aimed at reducing unnecessary compliance
costs for smaller companies while preserving important investor protections.157
One study comparing more than 3,000 small US issuers from 2003 to 2005 and a pre-S-Ox
404 control period suggests that the exemption has had unintended consequences,
specifically, that smaller firms have had an incentive to remain below the public float
threshold.158 It documented that these firms remained small by undertaking less
investment, making more cash payouts to shareholders through dividends and share
repurchases, and reducing the number of shares held by non-affiliates.159 The authors also
found that, because the testing date of a firm’s filing status occurs only once each fiscal
year, the nonaccelerated filers post-S-Ox have adopted various techniques to exert
Principles Needed in Addressing Implementation for Smaller Public Companies. Form 10-K Annual Report
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temporary downward pressure on share prices before testing their filing status, specifically,
actions related to short-term price impact, such as disclosing bad news in the second fiscal
quarter and reporting lower accounting earnings in the second fiscal quarter.160 The study
points out the potential incentive effects from a bright line market capitalization
delineation.
Overall, the market capitalization approach offers a relatively high degree of transparency,
in that market capitalization or public float are publicly disclosed. It offers a high degree
of fairness in that the size of the issuer determines what set of regulatory requirements an
issuer will have to meet. Its negative features are that it requires constant adjustment in
that market capitalization is highly dynamic. There need to be clear rules as to the
appropriate valuation date and the appropriate valuing of market capitalization. A date too
frequent for recalculating market capitalization or public float could be costly and time
consuming for issuers; however, a date too infrequent could create additional risks for the
market, in that issuers may have grown such that they should be complying with more
extensive requirements, but are not.
There is also the potential for a fairness issue in respect of investors, in the sense that
issuers may choose not to grow their market capitalization to remain within the
capitalization requirements of a smaller issuer. There may also be fairness issues at the
margins, in that those issuers close to the cutoff line may move back and forth over the line
under a market capitalization delineation.
The greatest disadvantage of a market capitalization approach may be the lack of choice for
issuers. Its practical result is that, if the company grows to a predetermined arbitrary
market cap, its regulatory obligations are going to change. If there are serious market
swings, issuers could bounce in and out of a category, creating large costs for regulatory
compliance. It may also create a stigma associated with such shifts, whereas delineation by
venture/non-venture retains an element of choice for the issuer in its own risk/reward
calculation. There is also some risk, as the US study found, of issuers making
inappropriate choices about the use of capital, in order to retain small issuer status, which
could affect investors’ interests and the long term interests of the company.
(c) Consolidated Revenue Approach
Another size of issuer approach to proportionate regulation is to use consolidated revenue
as the delineation, which can offer some transparency to investors. Fairness is engaged in
that all issuers with the same consolidated revenue are treated the same for regulatory
purposes. Another advantage is that it can offer strong evidence of issuer’s financial status
and does not rely on the liquidity of the market to determine size. However, consolidated
revenue by itself may not be the most accurate measure.
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In 1996, the OSC Task Force on Small Business Financing concluded that gross revenue
was the best vehicle to measure the appropriate size of an enterprise in the financing
context because, among other reasons, income and equity may be minimal even for entities
of considerable size.161 It would have supplemented the revenue test by a market
capitalization test to recognize issuers with large market capitalizations and insignificant
revenues, such as exploration stage resource issuers. The Task Force defined SMEs as
enterprises with not more than CDN$10 million in gross revenues in the most recently
completed financial year; and market capitalization, calculated on a fully diluted basis prior
to the proposed offering, of not more than CDN$35 million.162
One example of consolidated revenue being used in conjunction with other tests in Canada
is the new National Instrument 41-101, General Prospectus Requirements. Canadian
regulators expanded the opportunities for issuers to use the short form prospectus process
by removing the market capitalization eligibility requirements for reporting issuers, at the
same time as setting out specific requirements for junior and IPO venture issuers.163 NI 41101 came into force on March 17, 2008, creating a comprehensive and transparent set of
national prospectus requirements for all issuers, including certain investment funds. The
new rule maintains a high level of disclosure to investors while reducing costs for issuers
wishing to offer securities in more than one jurisdiction. The Instrument is based on three
general principles: harmonization and consolidation of the general prospectus requirements
among Canadian jurisdictions; harmonization of the general prospectus requirements with
the continuous disclosure and short form prospectus disclosure regimes; and amendments
to the principles underlying the general prospectus requirements identified as a result of
regulatory reviews, applications for exemptive relief and public consultation.164
NI 41-101 came into force at the same time as Multilateral Instrument 11-102, Passport
System, and new national policies that streamline Canadian regulatory processes for
prospectuses and exemptive relief applications. This change opened up to several thousand
more issuers the possibility of using the short form prospectus process. The significance of
the de-emphasis on “point of sale” disclosure is in part an attempt to reduce the regulatory
burden on issuers raising capital, especially SMEs.165 The practical effect of the expansion
of NI 44-101 is that the traditional long form prospectus document is retained for IPOs
only.
NI 41-101 could be viewed as recognition of proportionate regulation in that it removed the
previous eligibility requirements, opening up the availability of the short form
prospectuses, but at the same time imposed additional disclosure requirements on IPO
venture issuers and junior issuers, in recognition that information about them may not be as
widely disseminated in the market. A junior issuer is defined as one that files a preliminary
prospectus, is not a reporting issuer in any jurisdiction, and whose total consolidated assets
161
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as at the date of the most recent balance sheet of the issuer included in the preliminary
prospectus are less than CDN$10 million, whose consolidated revenue as shown in the
most recent annual income statement of the issuer is less than CDN$10 million, and whose
shareholders’ equity as at the date of the most recent balance sheet included in the
preliminary prospectus is less than $10 million.166 Depending on the type of prospectus,
the Instrument sets timelines for determining revenue dates.167
A junior issuer must disclose additional information; specifically, the total funds available
and the following breakdown of those funds: the estimated net proceeds from the sale of
the securities offered under the prospectus; the estimated consolidated working capital
(deficiency) as at the most recent month end before filing the prospectus; and the total other
funds available to be used to achieve the principal purposes identified by the junior
issuer.168 A junior issuer that had negative operating cash flow in its most recently
completed financial year for which financial statements have been included in the
prospectus, must disclose the period of time the proceeds raised under the prospectus are
expected to fund operations, the estimated total operating costs necessary for the issuer to
achieve its stated business objectives, and the estimated amount of other material capital
expenditures during that period of time.169
NI 44-101 also distinguishes IPO venture issuers, meaning an issuer that files a long form
prospectus; is not a reporting issuer in any jurisdiction immediately before the date of the
final long form prospectus; and, at the date of the long form prospectus, does not have any
of its securities listed or quoted, has not applied to list or quote any of its securities, and
does not intend to apply to list or quote any of its securities, on the TSX, a US and other
foreign marketplace, other than AIM or the PLUS markets. If the issuer is a venture issuer
or an IPO venture issuer that has not had significant revenue from operations in either of its
last two financial years, it must disclose a breakdown of material components of capitalized
or expensed exploration and development costs, expensed research and development costs,
deferred development costs, general and administrative expenses, and additional specified
information.170
Thus, NI 44-101 is a form of targeted regulation, recognizing the need to focus the
disclosures of those issuers without a history in the market.
In the UK, the FSA defines small firms in its Prospectus Directive as companies, which,
according to their last annual or consolidated accounts, meet at least two of the following
three criteria: an average number of employees during the financial year of less than 250, a
total balance sheet not exceeding €43 million and an annual net turnover not exceeding €50
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million. Small Business is defined as a partnership, body corporate, unincorporated
association or mutual association with an annual turnover of less than £1 million or its
equivalent in any other currency at the relevant time.171 In the US, the SEC Advisory
Committee on Smaller Public Companies recommended that the SEC provide exemptive
relief from the S-Ox 404 requirements based primarily on a revenue test172 Small public
companies requesting exemption would have to establish that the estimated costs of
compliance would overly burden the company. As noted above, the SEC offered smaller
issuers some relief in June 2008, but based on the pre-existing non-accelerated filer status.
Thus while a consolidated revenue delineation has been used in combination with other
measures of size or sophistication in a few circumstances, it does not align with stock
exchange listing requirements. Junior issuers could face differing and perhaps conflicting
regulatory requirements if such an approach were adopted as a stand-alone threshold.
However, consolidated revenue could be used in conjunction with market capitalization for
very targeted proportionate regulation.
An example is the requirement for ICFR under NI 52-109. The TSX, in its submission to
regulators regarding the instrument, proposed that smaller TSX issuers should be able to
avail themselves of the ICFR design accommodation, based on a threshold of annual
audited revenue of CDN$2 million or a market capitalization of CDN$75 million or less, or
CDN$2 million in revenue and a market capitalization of CDN$300 million or less.173 It
suggested that rather than creating a system of individual issuers seeking relief from the
requirements, the accommodation could be available for issuers below such a threshold. It
observed that the available guidance offered by the COSO framework does not take into
account the organizational structure and staff complement that characterizes many SME
issuers on the TSX and that the CSA should develop a principles-based internal control
framework for SME issuers to allow issuers the appropriate tools that will assist them in
designing and evaluating ICFR, recognizing multiple sectors and the fact that SME issuers
do not have extensive internal control/risk management functions.174
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(d) Sector Approach
Another possible point of delineation is by sector, which is another variation on a market
capitalization distinction, as particular sectors tend have certain market capitalization
characteristics. Canada’s capital market has regional markets based on the type of
issuer.175 Based on aggregate public market capitalization, the Canadian capital market is
primarily represented by six major industrial groups: oil & gas; financial services; mining;
diversified industries; media and communications; and technology. Based on market
capitalization, the most significant industries are oil & gas, financial services and mining,
in that order. Sectoral proportionate regulation may not be a viable choice, as it lacks
fairness and transparency. There are, as noted above, specific disclosure requirements for
particular sectors, in terms of mandatory technical information, but these requirements are
focused regulation that does not reduce the burden of smaller issuer regulation. The OSC
Task Force on Small Business Financing in 1996 concluded that tailoring the thresholds on
an industry-by-industry basis would undermine the objective of comprehensible
regulation.176
In sum, there are a variety of criteria that could potentially serve as the threshold or
delineation for purposes of proportionate regulation. A canvass of Canadian securities
regulators indicates that most of the provincial and territorial securities regulators view
their jurisdiction as not explicitly having proportionate regulation in place, other than
through the endorsement of national instruments and policies. Regulators in Saskatchewan,
Manitoba, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, the Northwest Territories
and the Yukon have no explicit proportionate regulation based on size or market
capitalization unique to their jurisdictions; and no plans to develop and implement
proportionate regulation outside of the CSA initiated changes.177 One regulator suggested
that it would be too much of an administrative burden to create different sets of rules for
smaller companies.178 A unique regional or provincial approach to proportionate regulation
was viewed as prohibitive on a cost basis. The provinces that have smaller capital markets
and regulatory structures advised that they generally follow the lead of Ontario and other
provinces with more active capital markets.
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Since British Columbia has embraced outcomes-based regulation, the BCSC has observed
that it is unclear whether proportionate regulation will play an important role in the
province’s securities regulation.179 Under its approach, the tools for firm compliance are
tailored according to specific outcomes; hence, there is not much need for size-based
regulation.180 In its submission to the Expert Panel, the BCSC chose not to comment on
the issue of proportionate regulation, other than to note that any consideration to expand or
limit proportionate regulation should be based on the experience to date with proportionate
regulation in Canada.181
The Alberta Securities Commission (ASC) has expressed some interest in pursuing
proportionate regulation, given the make-up of Alberta’s companies.182 ASC has internally
produced some documents considering how it would be structured; however, none of them
have been finalized or published.183 Alberta's capital market represents a mix of senior and
junior issuers, and the ASC is considering how one could implement tiered regulation more
effectively.
In Ontario, the OSC’s Small Business Advisory Committee acknowledged the needs of
small issuers, as discussed above.184 The OSC has been very active in creating more
appropriate standards for venture issuers in the national instruments discussed above. It
considered asset-based regulation; however, the OSC concluded that such method was not
transparent and was too difficult for administrators to apply and investors to understand.
For example, the OSC has observed that issuer assets may fluctuate from year to year for
the purposes of MD&A; thus, the same issuer could be caught by the rule in one year, but
not in the following year.185 Thus the OSC has concluded that the type of listing approach
was the most transparent.186
In Québec, l'Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) reports that it has not published any
documents relating to proportionate regulation, and has not taken a public position on this
issue to date.187 However, proportionate regulation may already to some extent be reflected
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in the efforts undertaken by the AMF to harmonize requirements relating to issuers and
registrants with other jurisdictions, including the passport system and national instruments.
Nova Scotia does not have proportionate regulation in the public markets, other than
national instruments.188 However, Nova Scotia has an equity tax credit for small cap
companies that issue securities, called the Community Economic Development
Corporations Program (CEDCP).189 Corporations that qualify must complete different
filing requirements with respect to financial statements, press release obligations, and other
documents.190 Some key points for corporations that qualify under this program are that
issuers must have less than CDN$25 million in assets or revenue including all affiliated
corporations or associations.191 They must use a prescribed Offering Document, and are
prohibited from selling more than CDN$3 million in any one offering. The program has
prescribed time frames in which to complete the offering, and issuers must obtain a letter of
non-objection from the Nova Scotia Securities Commission and a Tax Credit Certificate
from the Nova Scotia Department of Finance.192 Nova Scotia also has some proportionate
regulation for its Community Economic Development Investment Fund (CEDIF), which is
a pool of capital formed through the sale of common shares to persons within a defined
community, aimed at encouraging business investment in the region.193
CSA is also assessing the possibility of expanding the scope of proportionate regulation, in
terms of testing whether regulators can develop appropriate responses applicable to the
entire Canadian capital market each time a regulatory initiative is introduced; if they
cannot, considering different regulations for different sized companies.
6. Proportionate Regulation for Seasoned or Larger Issuers
While not the focus of this paper, it merits note that proportionate regulation could benefit
more experienced or larger participants in the Canadian capital market. In the US, the SEC
has adopted a series of rules for well-known seasoned issuers (WKSIs) that relaxed
restrictions imposed on public offerings. The Securities Offering Reform Rules create a
new class of WKSIs comprised of issuers that are presumed to be the most widely followed
in the marketplace.194 WKSIs can use a new "automatic shelf registration" process, which
allows them to register unspecified amounts of specified types or classes of securities on
188
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immediately effective registration statements, without allocating between primary and
secondary offerings and can exclude more information from the base prospectus. It
eliminates the delivery requirement for final prospectuses.195
The shelf registration rules for WKSIs allow more flexibility and faster issuing. It loosens
"quiet period" rules that govern what the issuer can say before and during offering.
Communications by issuers more than 30 days before filing a registration statement will be
permitted without violating the "gun jumping" provisions, as long as they do not refer to an
offering that is the subject of a registration statement. For prospectus delivery, access
equals delivery, hence electronic access is sufficient.
The idea of proportionate regulation for seasoned issuers was developed at some length in
one of the research studies for the Task Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in
Canada. Professor Pritchard recommended that Canada could adopt a version of WKSI
status for the top tier of the TSX as part of streamlining the prompt offering prospectus
(POP) system.196 The study suggested that careful consideration should be given to the
appropriate standards for WKSI status in Canada, recommending that a standard of
CDN$350 million in market capitalization would strike a balance between the need for
information for investors and the economies available from streamlined regulation.197
The Task Force adopted that recommendation in its final report, recommending that
Canadian well-known seasoned issuer (C-WKSI) status be granted based on the CDN$350
million cap standard where issuers meet the qualification criteria for the POP system. The
Task Force offered detailed suggestions as to the type of information that would be
required for C-WKSI issuers to undertake follow on offerings without regulatory review.198
7. Broad Principles and Basic Tools
The above discussion illustrates that there are at least eight principal tools that can be used
to implement proportionate regulation:
o Exemption of junior issuers from specific requirements, because the time and
resources of imposing such requirements on junior issuers outweighs any
benefits of protection of the market.
o Scaled timelines, recognizing that junior issuers must access external resources
to comply and thus require longer periods to compile accurate periodic
disclosure.
o Transition timelines, which allow junior issuers longer to put in place new
required governance, financial controls, or other new standards, where it is
determined that they are necessary to advance the public policy goals of the
system.
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o Different frequency of reporting, such as semi-annually instead of quarterly,
where it is determined that investors and other market participants may not be
interested in quarterly financial reporting if they are receiving timely, full and
accurate material change disclosure.
o Modified requirements in terms of formal governance or internal control
requirements and the level of detail of disclosure, by modifying a rule that
applies to all issuers for junior issuers.
o Tailored requirements, which set disclosure requirements based on technical
information particular to a sector, to the issuer’s history in the market, or to its
revenue generating capacity.
o Guidance as to best practice, in terms of offering junior issuers information and
guidance on a range of compliance options that may be responsive to their
capital and operational structure, such as the design of control systems.
o Use of high level principles that should govern the conduct of issuers, and then
allow issuers to develop best practices appropriate to their size or resources
based on a principles/standards/outcomes based system.
For each of these tools, it is important to consider how they advance the goals of efficient
capital markets and investor protection; and to consider what is material and relevant to
market participants. Proportionate regulation should be viewed as scaled or focused to a
type of issuer, rather than the introduction of less rigorous standards. Investors must
understand the difference between market risk, i.e. that although the junior issuer had
complied with all regulatory requirements, the business may fail because the resource or
technology cannot be developed, and regulatory risk, in terms of whether or not the tools
chosen for proportionate regulation minimize the risk of issuer misconduct or shirking.
A key decision is the determination of any threshold. As discussed earlier, the type of
issuer (junior or venture) and the size of issuer (by market cap or consolidated revenue)
offer different kinds of thresholds. While there may be limited circumstances in which
more than one threshold is used, there is a risk of fragmentation where small issuers could
fall in different categories for different purposes, adding to cost and confusion. In cases
where it is critically important that there be a different threshold, there should be
transparency and certainty regarding the threshold and a solid rationale for creating a
different bright line. However, there could be instances where there is a single standard,
but the resulting practice, such as DC&P or ICFR, are scaled to the size and type of issuer.
Another determination is where securities regulation could benefit from consideration of
proportionate regulation in new areas. The exempt market, takeover bid regulation, and
continuous disclosure requirements could all be candidates for change. Under a
principles/standards/outcomes-based regulatory model, one would have to develop the high
level principles first and then allow the development of best practices, which in turn would
likely generate a fresh look at proportionate regulation in areas such as officer certification,
corporate governance and offering documents. Regulators could examine these areas in
considering any guidance they were to issue under a principles/standards/outcomes-based
system.
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A number of overriding principles or considerations can be drawn from the above
discussion, which should be considered in respect of a further move towards proportionate
regulation. They include:
•

Proportionate regulation must balance access to capital and the long term
sustainability of the market; a key objective is maintaining the integrity of Canadian
capital markets.

•

The benchmark of the regulatory system continues to be materiality, in that while
periodic disclosure or other compliance requirements may be proportionate, all
issuers must continue to ensure that material change is disclosed to the market in a
timely, accurate and comprehensible manner, a requirement that should not be
scaled.199

•

Decision making in respect of adopting further proportionate regulation should be
timely, transparent and relevant for market participants and should be implemented
only after broad consultation. A possible methodology is to identify a problem or
difficulty that may justify a proportionate response and then work with market
participants to scale the requirement appropriately, using one or more of the tools
cited above or other problem solving strategies.

•

There is a need for transparency and bright line delineation in respect of which issuers
fall in which category of proportionate regulatory requirements.

•

Investors must have a clear understanding of the risk associated with issuers that
comply with modified disclosure and governance requirements, including explanatory
notes on periodic reporting documents and prospectuses, public education and plain
language disclosure.

•

If the delineation is venture/non-venture, smaller issuers on the TSX and comparable
exchanges must be given guidance regarding compliance with the more extensive
requirements.

•

If the delineation is market capitalization, at either end of the market size, there is a
need for well-founded and transparent criteria on which to make of determination of
which category issuers are located.

•

Disclosed risk factors should be focused for all issuers, not overly generalized.

•

Any proportionate regulation must be accompanied by consistent and rigorous
compliance and enforcement, to ensure integrity of the market.
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•

Proportionate regulation can be used to reduce disproportionate compliance costs by
eliminating regulatory compliance requirements where they do not add value to the
integrity of the market.

•

Any proportionate regulation should recognize the extensive oversight of junior
issuers by the TSXV.

•

Any proportionate regulation must ensure that the costs of compliance associated
with any new requirements do not outweigh the benefits to market participants.

•

Under a shift to a principles/standards/outcomes based system, all market participants
must have a shared understanding of regulatory expectations, specifically, what broad
high level principles mean in practice.
o Develop high level principles that are universal and allow junior issuers to
develop best practices sensitive to their structure and needs.
o The flexibility of principles/standards/outcomes regulation should be used to
focus requirements on junior issuers, rather than create opaque expectations.
o There should be recognition that there is a continuum of principles/standards
and outcomes based regulation, and that any further shifts should occur after
measured consideration of benefits to the market, involving broad based and
meaningful consultation.
o Any evolution from existing standards should be measured, in terms of
assessing what outcomes a shift from current rules to principles or outcomes is
aimed at achieving and measuring the effectiveness of any shifts.
o Regulators assessing good governance practice should share that experience
with other market participants, increasing the overall knowledge base of good
practice.
o Resources need to be directed towards junior issuers in terms of supporting any
shift to principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation and transparent and
accessible guidance on best practice, so that junior issuers can develop the
capacity to meet practice compliance under any adopted principles.
o Resources are needed to allow junior issuers to participate in a meaningful way
with regulators in developing future policy or practice.
o Set appropriate strategic milestones for junior or small issuers.

•

Consultation regarding any shift to proportionate regulation and
principles/standards/outcomes-based regulation should be broad, including all market
participants, advocacy organizations and exchanges.

•

Any further move towards proportionate regulation should engage market participants
in consideration of regulatory standards and how they differentially impact market
participants.
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•

There should be wide-spread public education regarding the different risks associated
with issuers that are proportionately regulated.

•

Evaluation of proportionate regulation, under whatever type of system is adopted,
should measure outcomes against clearly articulated goals, including assessing clear
milestones, measure the culture of compliance, cost effectiveness, ease of
implementation, reduction of investor and market risk, and benefits to market
participants.
o Regulators need to develop tools for assessing compliance if a
principles/standards and outcomes based approach is adopted.

8. Conclusion
Particular features of Canada’s capital market inform our consideration of moving towards
a more proportionate regulatory system, specifically, Canada has a large number of small
public companies; its market cap is concentrated largely in four provinces; it has a
particular focus on mining, resources and technology; and a significant number of issuers
are cross-listed on US exchanges. Any further move towards proportionate regulation must
take account of these unique features.
A proportionate regulatory system could adopt broad high level principles, similar to the
FSA, as the backdrop for proportionate regulation. These principles could include that an
issuer must act with integrity and conduct its business with due skill, care and diligence; it
must take reasonable care to control its affairs responsibly, using size-appropriate risk
management systems; it must observe proper standards of market conduct and have regard
to the interests of its investors, creditors and customers and treat them fairly; it must
disclose material information in a timely, accurate and accessible manner; and it must deal
with its regulators in an open co-operative manner.
Canadian securities regulators have already recognized some measure of proportionate
regulation in their national instruments based on the type of listing, and the process of
building consensus allows for further development of proportionate regulation in a manner
that is responsive to regional differences and to the unique size of Canadian issuers, the
particular sectors, and the earlier periods in which junior issuers come to public markets.
The venture/non-venture distinction for proportionate regulation appears to be the most
convenient delineation in Canada, given the high degree of concentration of Canadian
listings on the TSX and TSXV. However, a proportionate system could analyse whether
there are instances in which market capitalization for junior issuers may be a more
appropriate criterion for an exemption from particular regulatory requirements. A market
capitalization approach may meet fairness considerations in terms of treating similarly
sized issuers the same, but as the discussion of the SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller
Public Companies’ criteria suggests, using a number of determinants to define a “smaller
public company” such as the total market capitalization of the company and a measurement
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metric that is self-calibrating and facilitates the scaling of regulation, may create
considerable transaction costs. If implemented, it will require clear and firm transition
rules; and clear rules as to the appropriate valuation date and the appropriate valuing of
market capitalization. What the above noted principles suggest is that there are multiple
ways in which junior or small issuers can be accommodated through scaled requirements,
and there may be instances in which more than one delineation is used.
Canada could possibly benefit from the introduction of a system similar to the NOMAD
system in the UK, although there would have to be consideration of the cost consequences
to junior issuers, given their size in Canada. There would also need to be an assessment of
the risks associated with moving this aspect of the regulatory system into the private
sphere. Given that Canadian issuers go to the market earlier in their development, any
consideration of such a system would have to measure the risks and benefits that are unique
to the size and structure of the Canadian market. Moreover, the slow but steady increase in
foreign issuers listed in Canada may raise new questions about accepted levels of internal
governance controls and compliance norms that should be carefully considered.
The paper canvasses how proportionate regulation can operate under different regulatory
structures. Clearly, it is being introduced within the passport system in an innovative and
thoughtful manner, as discussed at length in part 5. A move towards a more principles and
outcomes based system would offer opportunities for further development of proportionate
regulation under any regulatory structure adopted. In terms of proportionate regulation
under a hybrid securities law structure, a common regulator could continue to develop
proportionate regulation on a national basis, in a timely fashion, having regard for regional
needs and input as discussed above.200 While national buy-in of all jurisdictions would be
the goal of any new regulatory principles or standards for junior or seasoned issuers, all
issuers would have the potential to immediately opt into a proportionate regulation system
by registering with the common regulator. In essence, there would be a market for
registration, as issuers could list with the common regulator or with a passport provincial
jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the best approach to further developing proportionate regulation is one that
offers a transparent public debate on both its advantages and disadvantages. That debate
needs to take place in the context of a move towards greater principles and outcomes-based
approaches and within the context of a regulatory framework that is more efficient and
effective at regulating Canadian capital markets.
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